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ABSTRACT
The behavior of matter at the molecular level can be programmed to create nanoscale
molecular components that accomplish desired tasks. Many molecular components are
developed with intended uses that are safety-critical, such as medical applications. Ensuring
the correctness and fault tolerance of such devices is paramount. Techniques to develop
robustly correct programs have been widely studied in software systems and many devices
have been constructed to aid in the safe operation of systems. We seek to demonstrate the
effectiveness of software and safety engineering techniques in the molecular programming
domain.
In this thesis, we present the design of five new devices to aid in the development of
safety-critical molecular programmed systems. We introduce a Runtime Fault Detection
device (RFD) to robustly detect faults and initiate recovery actions in response to a failed
system. We present the Concentration Monitor, a device that can detect changes, major and
minor, in concentrations in real-time and demonstrate its utility. We also describe methods
for constructing chemical reaction networks that can robustly simulate any combinational
logic gate. Finally, we present two devices to log the state of a molecular program, where
the first device logs a state upon receiving a request, and the second device ensures that the
current state meets a defined validity property before allowing a log to be taken. All devices
have been formally verified using model checking, simulations, or formal proof techniques.
The methods used to construct and verify these devices can be adapted to the design of
future molecular systems to assist in ensuring their correctness.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Molecular programming is a domain where matter, such as DNA strands or chemicals,
is programmed to achieve a desired behavior. The beginnings of the field trace to Seeman
in the 1980s [53], for his work on DNA crystals that self assembled from DNA strands.
Interest in the field began growing when Winfree proved the Turing universality of the model
[66]. Many advancements have appeared in the field in years since, from Boolean circuits
[7, 57, 62], to DNA based nano-robots [6, 12], to devices that contain drugs for delivery to
targeted cells [15, 67, 44].
Though DNA strands are a physical concrete medium, a large amount of research
is performed on more abstract mediums, such as Chemical Reaction Networks (CRNs).
CRNs are an abstract model of computation that emulates the behavior of many molecular
programs. They have been widely studied since at least the 1940s [14]. In recent years
the CRN model has begun to be viewed as a programming language for the development
of molecular programs. The change is largely due to work by Soloveichik, Seelig, and
Winfree, who showed that DNA strands can be used to implement any CRN [55]. Now,
CRNs are widely used as an abstract programming language that can, through the use of
automated tools [2], be compiled into a DNA strand displacement system for experimentation
or deployment.
A system is safety-critical if a system failure can lead to loss of life, equipment, or
significant amounts of money. Many intended applications of molecular devices are safety-
critical in nature, such as using nano-robots to deliver drugs, therefore it is critical to
ensure that devices not only achieve the desired behavior, but are also robust to any failures.
2Software and safety engineering techniques have been used to achieve these goals for many
years. Techniques such as goal oriented requirements engineering [64], a process by which
informal system goals are turned into a formal specification, aid in the analysis of a system’s
intended use for possible faults or failures. Previously, goal oriented requirements engineering
has been used to analyze a molecular system and find obstacles that would hinder correct
operation [45, 46]. Formal methods, specifically model checking, have been shown to be
useful in the study of programmed nanodevices [38].
In this thesis, we present results concerning the application of software engineering
techniques towards the construction of molecular devices to ensure safety in molecular
programs. We utilize requirements engineering techniques to develop a specification for the
devices to ensure that they reflect the intended behavior. Using formal methods including
simulation, model checking and formal proofs we verify the accuracy of our designs in terms
of the specifications.
The capability to detect and recover from potential faults in a device is important in a
molecular program. We introduce an extension of the Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT)
constructed from stochastic chemical reaction networks, a device that monitors the health
of another system and issues an alarm if a fault is detected, in Chapter 2. Watchdog timers
are widely used in software systems to monitor the health of critical components. We briefly
review the initial version, originally presented in Samuel Ellis’ Masters thesis [20], then
discuss the development of subsequent iterations. We present a goal diagram, generated
using goal oriented requirements engineering [64] techniques, for a MWT and a formal
specification using Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [1]. We then discuss the iterative
tool assisted process used to verify the design of the device against the specification and the
results of the verification.
Chapter 3 introduces a device called a Concentration Monitor, used to detect whether
a concentration is above or below specified bounds. We present a set of requirements for
the concentration monitor and use formal analysis to ensure that the design satisfies the
3specification. The concentration monitor is designed to be robust with respect to a number
of factors, discussed further in Section 3.1, including errors at initialization and during
runtime. We provide an example application of the concentration monitor through the
construction of a molecular watchdog timer for deterministic chemical reaction networks.
Logic circuits play a key role in the operation of computer systems, and it is imperative
that their operation is both correct and robust. Utilizing the concentration monitor, we
present a method for constructing arbitrary logic circuits out of CRNs in Chapter 4. We
present the construction of a CRN based NAND gate and formally prove its correctness.
We present a proof for the creation of arbitrary logic gates using the CRN based NAND
gate and show that the operation of the composed circuit remains correct and robust.
Software systems often use logs, append only files that are written to over time, to study
the behavior of a system, especially if the system encountered a fault. In Chapter 5, we
present two devices to construct a log of a molecular system’s state over time. The first
device is capable of logging the state of its monitored system at any time by being given a
predetermined input signal. The second device extends the first by only logging the state
when it is determined to be valid, based on a predetermined validity property. Both devices
provide a log which can be read by an external user or another molecular program. We show
give a proof that both devices perform the desired behavior robustly and correctly. We then
discuss an extension of the logging devices to create a history of stored states which can be
used for checkpointing and rollback.
All the devices presented assist in the construction of robust molecular programs. They
enable the detection of faults both at runtime and through later study. The devices can also
support the recovery of a system from faults through initiating recovery actions and rolling
back to a previous system state. In addition to the devices themselves, the processes used in
their specification, design, and verification can all be applied to the construction of future
molecular systems.
41.1 Related Work
Model checking as applied to molecular systems has gained interest in recent years.
Kwiatkowska and Thachuk described their use of the probabilistic model checker PRISM
to perform probabilistic verification of Chemical Reaction Networks (CRNs) for biological
systems [38]. Their work showed the benefits of probabilistic model checking for molecular
systems and informed our work for the Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT) and the Runtime
Fault Detection Device (RFD). Visual DSD, a design tool for DNA strand displacement [42],
can generate a model of a DNA system for use in PRISM. PRISM has been used previously
to model a variety of biological case studies, including DNA circuits and DNA nanorobotic
walkers [12, 40]. PRISM also has been used widely to model probabilistic protocols, e.g., in
distributed sensor networks, and stochastic multi-player games [37].
We utilized the Lotka-Volterra 3-phase oscillator to construct an example monitored
system for use with the RFD. Ballarini, Mardare and Mura, and Ballarini and Guerriero
performed analysis on the Lotka-Volterra 3-phase oscillator using PRISM and described both
of the failures modes that our MWT design successfully detects [4, 3]. Our work differs in
that we performed verification on an interface attached to the oscillator and its composition
with the RFD.
Stochastic Petri net formalisms, as in the model checker SMART, have been used to
model signal transduction in biological pathways [26]. SMART has been used to model other
types of stochastic systems, e.g., in a NASA-funded study to evaluate an airport runway
safety monitor protocol for false alarms [54]. A good overview of the formalisms used in
population models, including the stochastic petri nets used in SMART, appears in [27].
Due to the scale of molecular systems, there is a disconnect between the size of a feasible
model for automatic checking and the intended system. We are often forced to find ways to
restrict the size of our models to perform model checking. Pavese, Barberman and Uchitel
described how to develop partial explorations of a system model automatically [51]. Their
technique has promise for use in molecular programs that we hope to explore. Since many
5molecular programs deal with extremely large, if not infinite, state spaces, probabilistic
model checking on partial system explorations might provide bounds on the reliability of a
molecular system that is too large to model check.
The values used for parameters in stochastic models are usually derived from experimen-
tation or are only partially known. Small differences between a models’ parameter values
and their counterparts in the real world can have a drastic effect on verification results.
Meedeniya et al. generated reliability evaluations of a probabilistic model of an antilock
brake system with uncertain parameters using Monte Carlo simulations [47]. Su, Chen,
Feng, and Rosenblum extended previous work by Su and Rosenblum [59] on perturbations
in model checking parameters in discrete-time Markov chains to allow model checking on
time-bounded continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs) with imprecise values for transition
rates [58]. The imprecision present in the reaction rates of molecular systems raises the
importance of determining the effects of perturbations in parameter values.
The modeling of biological systems has seen many advances in the past few years.
Yordanov et al. formalized and encoded DNA computing to allow use of Satisfiability Modulo
Theories (SMT) [68]. Fisher, Harel and Henzinger performed computational modeling of
biological systems as reactive systems [22]. Hetherington et al. and Sumner et al. utilized
sub-models of a biological system to compose an advanced model [28, 60]. David et al.
created translators to convert SimBiology models for biological systems into CTMCs for
stochastic model checking or into Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) for simulation
[13]. SimBiology is a package from MATLAB that handles biological systems [61].
Through the development of the MWT and RFD, our experiences made it clear that the
requirements and architecture should co-evolve, this is consistent with the “Twin Peaks” idea
described by Nuseibeh [49]. We made extensive use of the probabilistic model checker to check
the alignment of goals with design alternatives. The obstacle analysis gave us a framework for
selecting among alternative designs [64]. We encountered great difficulty correctly specifying
the requirements for the MWT. We often discovered that our requirements needed to change
6to reflect new understandings gained through the automated analysis of the formal models.
Often, the constraints of the domain drove our revision of the requirements. Whalen et al.,
reported similar experiences developing requirements for large avionic systems, in which
the requirements were just as likely to be right or wrong. [65]. Like us, they found that
analyzing formal models was effective in discovering inconsistencies between environmental
assumptions and the requirements they derived for their systems.
Oscillators play an important role in biology which has increased interest in their study.
Hori and Murray, in a recent paper on synthetic biochemical oscillators, stated that, “The
reliable engineering of oscillators is an important milestone towards robust synthesis of more
complex dynamical circuits in synthetic biology” [30]. Fern et al. reported the use of timer
circuits to precisely coordinate chemical events in vitro [21]. 3-phase oscillators seem to
have been first reported in [39] and more recently [8, 9, 41]. The 2-phase Lotka-Volterra
oscillator also has been studied in the context of DNA strand displacement in [56, 41]. As
stated earlier, formal model checking was performed on the Lotka-Volterra 3-phase oscillator
in [4, 3].
Different motifs for designing molecular circuits have been proposed. Hjelmfelt, Wein-
berger, and Ross proposed the use of chemical based logic gates to construct neural networks
and Turing machines [29]. Ogihara and Ray showed that a DNA computer could be used to
simulate unbounded fan-in boolean circuits [50]. Qian and Winfree used DNA to construct
a four-bit square-root circuit [52] Ge, Zhong, Wen, You, and Zhang presented different
approaches for using Karnaugh maps to create combinatorial logic gates [23]. They used
simulations to compare the stability and robustness of the different constructions. Our
gates differ by being robust with respect to perturbations in rate constants, initial values,
measurement function, and input concentrations. Our gates also update their output in real
time, with a programmed delay, to changes in the inputs.
Molecular programs communicate with each other through the presence and absence of
molecular signals. Barish, Rothemund and Winfree in 2005 showed that DNA self-assemblies
7could pass data by propagating binary information along a DNA tube by making copies of
that pattern [5]. Hsiao, Hori, Rothemund, and Murray showed that the sensing and recording
of sequences of chemical inputs across bacterial cell populations could be performed with
temporal logic gates [31]. Our work on the logging devices differs in a few ways. First, our
devices are robust with respect to a number of factors. Second, the valid only logging device
is capable of determining if a state is valid or not before performing a log.
1.2 Background
Here we present some background information to aid in understanding the work in this
thesis.
1.2.1 Stochastic Chemical Reaction Networks
Chemical reaction networks (CRNs) are an abstraction of molecular processes that are
occurring in a well mixed solution. CRNs are a desirable abstract model that acts as a
programming language for molecular programs. Stochastic CRNs (SCRNs) are a class of
CRNs where each molecular species has a finite integer count for its population. SCRNs
are ideal for modeling small scale systems, tens to a few hundreds of molecules, since the
presence or absence of a single molecule affects the behavior of the system, such as the
presence of a single viral genome within a living cell. The SCRN model dates back to at
least the 1940s [14], but has been widely studied since [24, 63, 25].
An SCRN consists of a tuple N = (S, R), where S contains a set of species and R
contains a set of reactions over the species in S. Each species is given an abstract label (e.g.
A) and has an integer molecular count denoting its population at a given point in time. We
define the current state of an SCRN as an integer vector over the set of species S. The set
R contains a set of chemical reactions, each of which is a tuple ρ = (r, p, k) where
r - an integer vector of reactants over the set S.
p - an integer vector of products over the set S.
8k - a rate constant specifying the speed the reaction occurs.
A reaction ρ is usually written in the form
A0 + · · ·+Ai k−→ B0 + · · ·+Bj .
A0, . . . , Ai are the reactants, which are both necessary for ρ to occur and are consumed by
the reaction. B0, . . . , Bj are the products, these are produced when ρ occurs. If a species
appears in both the reactant vector and the product vector it is called a catalyst, which is
necessary for the reaction to occur but is not consumed by the reaction.
For clarity, consider the following example. Given a CRN N = (S, R) with S = {A,B,C}
and R containing only the reaction
ρ ≡ A+B k−→ 2C.
The reaction ρ has a reactant vector (1, 1, 0), a product vector (0, 0, 2) and a rate constant
k. If an A molecule and B molecule are both present in the solution and interact with one
another, they will be consumed to produce two molecules of C at a rate k.
SCRNs contain integer molecular counts, meaning their behavior can be described by
a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC)[14]. CTMCs are a useful model for our work as
they are supported by the model checker PRISM [37]. A CTMC is a directed graph where
nodes are states of the system and edges are transitions between the states. We assign each
state in a CTMC to a possible state in the operation of the SCRN. We start with an initial
state, a vector with the initial population counts. From the initial state, for each reaction,
we create a transition to a new state where the reaction has been applied, i.e. the reactants
subtracted and the products added to the current state. We continue this process recursively
for each state until the set of possible states for the SCRN are included. We call this set
of states the statespace of the CTMC. We assign a rate to each transition based on the
reactants and the rate constant. For a given reaction ρ = (r, p, k), we assign a rate as
k(A0)(A1) . . . (Ai)
volume(i−1)
,
9where A0, . . . , Ai represent their current population within the solution and are only the
species with non-zero counts in the reactant vector of ρ. If a reaction is unary, i.e. only has
one reactant, its rate is a special case and is defined as
k(A0).
The rate determines how much continuous time passes while a transition occurs. The
probability of a transition occurring is determined by its rate over the sum of the rates of
all possible reactions in the current state.
Likewise, an SCRN can be modeled as a probabilistic Petri-net (PPN). PPNs are a useful
model for our work as they are supported by the model checker SMART [10]. A PPN consists
of a set of states which contain integer numbers of tokens, and a set of transitions which
move tokens between states. We construct a single state for each species in S. The current
population of a species is specified by the number of tokens in its place. We also construct
a transition for each reaction in R. We assign rates and probabilities to the transitions as
above in CTMCs.
1.2.2 I/O Chemical Reaction Networks
Input/Output Chemical Reaction Networks (I/O CRNs) are a special class of CRNs,
defined here under deterministic mass action kinetics. I/O CRNs were first defined in Titus
Klinge’s thesis [32], and have been used to study robust logic gates [17]. We adopt their
syntax to discuss I/O CRNs. I/O CRNs are a useful model for dealing with signal and
information passing between different CRNs. The basic structure of deterministic CRNs is
the same as SCRNs. A CRN N = (S, R) contains a set of species S and a set of reactions R.
Each reaction ρ in R is a tuple ρ = (r, p, k), where the reactant vector r, product vector p,
and rate constant k are defined as above in SCRNs. The primary difference is in the counts
of the species. Where S is an integer vector in an SCRN, here S is a vector of real numbers.
We call the current population value of a species its concentration.
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An I/O CRN is a tuple N = (U,R, S) where U, S ⊆ S are finite sets of species and no
element that appears in U can appear in S, that is U ∩S = ∅, and R is a set of reactions over
U ∪ S. The set U is called the set of input species and the set S is the set of state species.
Any element that appears in U may only be used catalytically, i.e. non-destructively, by any
reactions in R.
In deterministic mass action kinetics an I/O CRNs state is a vector x ∈ [0,∞)|S|. We
note the concentration of a species Y ∈ S by x(Y ). An I/O CRN also has an input state,
a vector u ∈ [0,∞)|U |, and a global state, a vector (x, u) ∈ [0,∞)|U∪S|. A W -signal space
is a set C [W ] = C([0,∞), [0,∞)|W |) with C(X,Y ) as the set of continuous functions from
X to Y , for a given finite set W ⊆ S. An I/O CRN has a context, defined as a tuple
c = (u, V, h). We call u the input function of the I/O CRN and define it as u ∈ C [U ].
Informally, u is a vector denoting the concentrations of all species in the input set U . We call
V the output species, defined as V ⊆ S, which specifies the state species used to produce
an output from the I/O CRN. Finally, we call h the measurement function, defined as
h : [0,∞)|U∪S| → [0,∞)|V | which defines the behavior of the output species V based on a
global state, a set of concentrations for the input and state species. We use CN to reference
the set of all contexts for a given I/O CRN N .
Each reaction ρ in an I/O CRN N has a rate dependent on the concentrations of all
involved species. For a given global state (x, u) ∈ [0,∞)|U∪S|, the rate of a reaction ρ is
defined by the real value
ratex,u(ρ) = k(ρ)
∏
Y ∈(U∪S)
(x, u)(Y )r(ρ)(Y ). (1.1)
Here, k(ρ) is the rate constant of reaction ρ and (x, u)(Y )r(ρ)(Y ) denotes the concentration
of a species Y raised to the power of its activity in the reaction. More simply, if a species Y
is not involved in the reaction, its activity is 0, meaning its involvement in the rate is a 1.
If the species Y is involved in the reaction, its activity is a 1, meaning its involvement in
the rate is equivalent to its concentration. A species Y ∈ S has a deterministic mass action
function that determines how it will change over time, given the current global state. This
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function is defined as
FY (x, u) =
∑
ρ∈R
∆ρ(Y ) · ratex,u(ρ). (1.2)
where ∆ρ is the net effect of the reaction, subtracting the reactants and adding the products.
In deterministic mass action kinetics, the behavior of a CRN is modeled by a series of
ordinary differential equations (ODEs). For a given species Y ∈ S and a context of the I/O
CRN N , the ODE for Y is
y′(t) = FY (x(t), u(t)), (1.3)
for all t ∈ [0,∞). Informally, given a time t, the species Y will change based on the global
state at time t. The ODE can be rewritten in the form
x′(t) = F (x(t), u(t)), (1.4)
for all t ∈ [0,∞) by defining a function for each Y ∈ S, F (x, u)(Y ) = FY (x, u).
Given an initial state x0 ∈ [0,∞)|S|, by the standard theory of ODEs, the system of
ODEs has a unique solution x(t). Using the measurement function, we can now define the
output signal of an I/O CRN N as
Nx0,c(t) = h(x(t)), (1.5)
for all t ∈ [0,∞) for a given initial state and context. The output signal is the behavior of
the defined output species V , that is, how V will change over time given an initial state and
a context.
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CHAPTER 2. FAULT DETECTION OF MOLECULAR SYSTEMS AT
RUNTIME
When dealing with safety-critical systems, a failure can have disastrous consequences,
leading to massive losses. Therefore, it is important that any fault is quickly detected so
it can be properly handled before any losses occur. Introducing devices to both monitor
for faults and make either another system or a user aware when they occur is a necessary
step. One such device is a watchdog timer, a device which monitors a system for a fault
and raises an alarm upon its occurrence [34, 43]. It does so through the use of a heartbeat.
The monitored system provides a heartbeat at a regular interval, as long as the signal is
being received, the monitored system has not encountered a failure. If a long enough period
of time has occurred since the previous heartbeat, the watchdog timer assumes that the
monitored system has failed and produces an alarm signal.
Watchdog timers have widely been used in order to detect faults and prevent failures
within software systems. One such example is the Voyager spacecraft. The command
computer would receive a heartbeat signal every two seconds from the attitude control
computer upon completion of its self tests. In the event that a heartbeat was not received,
the command computer would respond by activating the backup processor [48]. We present
designs for devices that monitor the health of a molecular system and provide an alarm
if a fault is detected. Each device is an iteration of a Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT)
constructed from Stochastic Chemical Reaction Networks (SCRNs).
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ACHIEVE
Watchdog Timer
AVOID
Alarm if time<t
ACHIEVE
Alarm if time>t
ACHIEVE
Reset time on HB
Molecular Alarm
ACHIEVE
Timer reset
AVOID
False HB detection
ACHIEVE
Detect HB
Molecular Clock Molecular Clock Molecular Clock
ACHIEVE
Initiate alarm
ACHIEVE
Delay for t time
Molecular Clock Molecular Alarm
Alarm is Mutual 
Exclusive
Alarm is Mutual 
Exclusive
Figure 2.1 Original Goal Diagram for a Molecular Watchdog Timer.
2.1 Original Molecular Watchdog Timer
The work presented in this subsection (2.1) was previously presented in Samuel Ellis’
master’s thesis [20]. A brief review of it is included in this chapter because the remaining
two sections of this chapter are extensions of it.
2.1.1 Requirements of the MWT
We constructed a goal diagram for the molecular watchdog timer. We defined the high
level goal “If the monitored system does not provide the appropriate signal within a specified
time, then issue an alarm.” We derived subgoals from the high level goal until we had only
leaf goals.
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LadderReactions
Lr + U
k−→ Y + U
...
L3 + U
k−→ L4 + U
L2 + U
k−→ L3 + U
L1 + U
k−→ L2 + U
Heartbeat Reset Reactions
Y +H
k−→ L1
Lr +H
k−→ L1
...
L2 +H
k−→ L1
L1 +H
k−→ L1
Figure 2.2 Original Absence Detector Reactions.
The leaf goals covered the tasks of correctly detecting if the heartbeats were present,
resetting the timer if the heartbeat was present, and initiating an alarm if the heartbeat
was absent for a sufficient length of time. To satisfy the leaf goals, we defined two agents, a
molecular alarm and a molecular clock. The molecular alarm simply needed to be a chemical
species. When the species is present, the alarm is considered “on”, when it is absent, the
alarm is “off.” The molecular clock needed to be a device that could detect the heartbeat
molecules and reset a timer based on their presence.
2.1.2 Design of the MWT
We tried a number of designs to satisfy the goals in the goal diagram. After encountering
a number of obstacles, we settled on a design with two main components, an absence detector
and a threshold filter. The absence detector consists of ladders, programmed cascades of
reactions, that climb naturally over time and are reset by consuming heartbeat molecules.
The CRN for the absence detector is shown in Figure 2.2. The absence detectors satisfy
the goals of detecting the presence or absence of heartbeats and reacting accordingly.
The threshold filter reads the outputs of the absence detector to determine if a pro-
grammed threshold number of absence detector ladders have not found any heartbeat
molecules, in which case it issues an alarm. The threshold filter CRN is shown in Figure 2.3.
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Detection Reactions
Tn + Y
k−→ D + Y
...
T3 + Y
k−→ T4 + Y
T2 + Y
k−→ T3 + Y
T1 + Y
k−→ T2 + Y
Threshold Reactions
Tn +R
k−→T1 +R
...
T3 +R
k−→T1 +R
T2 +R
k−→T1 +R
T1 +R
k−→T1 +R
Figure 2.3 Original Threshold Filter Reactions.
2.1.3 Verification of the MWT
We first discussed proofs for the MWT satisfying the goal diagram. Based on a set of
domain properties, we reasoned about the MWTs behavior. We discussed how each leaf goal
is satisfied by its agent. For example, the leaf goal Achieve[Delay for t time.] is satisfied by
the absence detectors. The absence detectors have a programmable delay in their expected
climb time. By programming the delay higher than t, the leaf goal is satisfied. We then
showed that each set of subgoals satisfied their parent goals. In this way, our MWT design
satisfied our goal diagram.
With no formal specification for each leaf goal, we could not perform model checking
directly on the requirements. To show the correctness, we instead used the model checkers
PRISM [37] and SMART [10, 11] to generate probabilities based on different constructions.
The primary goal was to ensure that the probability of false positives and false negatives
were both controllable and ideally very low. In terms of the MWT:
• False Positive: While heartbeats are present, the MWT issues an alarm.
• False Negative: While heartbeats are absent, the MWT does not issue an alarm.
We created models of the absence detector using both tools. We then defined a property
to generate the probability of issuing an alarm before a specified time.
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• PRISM Property:
P=? [F=T Y >= (0.8 ∗MAXL)]
• SMART Property:
prob at(tk(Y ) >= (0.8 ∗ n), T )
We checked this property over different configurations of our models. We tested variations
on number of heartbeats, size of heartbeats, the time heartbeats were inserted, and the
length of the absence detectors.
We also tested variations of the threshold filter using a model in SMART. We wanted to
show that the threshold filter had a low probability of initiating an alarm when the number
of absence detectors that found no heartbeat molecules was below the threshold. We defined
a SMART property to model this behavior.
probDatT : prob at(tk(D)! = 0, t) (2.1)
To show the controllability of the threshold filter, we tested different lengths of threshold
ladders in addition to the strength of the threshold to see their effect on this property.
2.2 Refining the MWT
The work presented in this subsection was previously presented at the 29th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE 2014) and was performed
in collaboration with Eric R. Henderson, Titus H. Klinge, James I. Lathrop, Jack H. Lutz,
Robyn R. Lutz, Divita Mathur, and Andrew S. Miner [16].
2.2.1 Single Use Watchdog Timer
We formalized the goal diagram from the original MWT to enable software based model
checking of the design. We performed formal verification on the design and requirements of
the molecular watchdog timer to ensure their accuracy using model checking and simulation.
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2.2.2 Requirements Analysis
2.2.2.1 Goal Diagram
We specified the system goals for the MWT using an approach introduced in [45, 46]
based on the KAOS [64] method developed by Axel van Lamsweerde. One of the primary
advantages of goal-based approaches is in the refinement process. You begin with an
informally written goal, a simple description of the behavior desired from the system. You
then incrementally refine it into a formal specification. We constructed a goal diagram, a
graph consisting of goals with AND/OR refinements, for the MWT. We began by defining a
high level goal for the system, the desired behavior of the device. Then, using AND/OR
refinements, we produced a set of subgoals whose satisfaction implies the satisfaction of their
parent goals. We continue this process until each goal, called a leaf goal, can be achieved by
a single agent of the system.
Each goal is specified as an ACHIEVE, AVOID, or MAINTAIN goal. An achieve goal is
a behavior the system must meet to satisfy a requirement. An avoid goal is a behavior the
system must not encounter to satisfy a requirement. Maintain goals are behaviors that must
always be active during system operation.
We redefined the high level goal as “the MWT shall issue an alarm if and only if no
heartbeat signal is detected within a specified time bound”. This is reflected in the top level
goal of the goal diagram, Figure 2.4, Achieve[Alarm iff no Heartbeat provided within t time].
We refined the high level goal into two main subgoals
• Initiating an alarm only when it is correct to do so.
• Correct alarm behavior.
The first task if further refined a few times and its leaf goals are assigned to the original
components, the absence detector and the threshold filter. The second goal was refined into
three leaf goals that are assigned to a new agent, the amplifier.
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Alarm iff no Heartbeat
is provided within
t time
ACHIEVE
ACHIEVE
ACHIEVE
ACHIEVEAVOID MAINTAIN
AlarmTripped iff no
Heartbeat detected
in t’’ time
Alarm iff AlarmTripped
and within t-t’ time of
the first AlarmTripped
Alarm if Not
AlarmTripped
Alarm if AlarmTripped Alarm if the Alarm
has been issued
ACHIEVE
AlarmTripped iff
no Heartbeat provided
in t’ time
ACHIEVE
AlarmTripped iff
Threshold met
Correct Delay
ACHIEVE
Correct timer Reset
ACHIEVE
ACHIEVE
Threshold if Hdet  is
absent
Threshold delay if 
Reset
ACHIEVEACHIEVE
Reset if HdetInitialize to Reset
ACHIEVE AVOID
AlarmTripped until 
first threshold
AlarmTripped if 
Reset
AVOID ACHIEVE
AlarmTripped if 
threshold for some
time
ACHIEVE
ACHIEVE
Hdet Correctly tracks the
presence of Heartbeats
within t’-t’’ time
Hdet when Heartbeat
is present
Hdet when Heartbeat
is not present
AVOID
Figure 2.4 Goal diagram for the single use molecular watchdog timer.
2.2.2.2 Environmental Assumptions
To determine goal satisfaction, it is necessary to analyze the environment a system will
be deployed in and determine any assumptions we must make about it. The MWT operates
in a molecular environment, that is, a nanoscale environment with molecules floating around
in a liquid solution. Some assumptions on the behavior of systems in molecular environments
must be made in order to model their behavior. We utilize four environmental assumptions
to ensure that the goal diagram is satisfied by our design.
1. Heartbeat presence is controlled entirely by the environment, meaning the MWT does
not create any H molecules.
2. Heartbeats are “doses” of H molecules added into the solution. The size of the doses
must fall within a specified range.
3. The only molecular species in the environment that interacts with the MWT is the
heartbeat species H.
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4. The MWT is operating in a well mixed solution, that is, molecules are present evenly
throughout the solution, instead of being bunched together in small parts.
The size range of the heartbeat doses is determined based on other parameters within
the goals, such as the population size of each species in the model.
2.2.2.3 Goal Formalization
Each goal is an informal description of a desired system behavior. However, in order to
design a system and perform formal verification, it is necessary to have a formal specification
for each goal. We use continuous stochastic logic (CSL) [1] to specify each goal. We chose
to use CSL because it handles continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs) which define the
behavior of our CRN model. It is also available in two model checking tools that we use,
the Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker (PRISM) [37] and the Stochastic Model-checking
Analyzer for Reliability and Timing (SMART) [10, 11]. We include the formal specification
in CSL of each goal in Figure 2.4. These goals are ordered in breadth first order following
the order of the figure.
Our specification has four user defined parameters so that a construction can be made
to meet nearly any needs. The parameters the user must provide are:
u - Alarm should not be issued within u-time of the last heartbeat
v - Alarm should be issued at least by v-time of the last heartbeat
 - Probability of error allowed by the u-delay
δ - Probability of error allowed by the v-delay
Below is the top-level goal of our diagram. Given parameters, u, v, , δ, the following
constraints are placed on the top-level goal:
(1− 1)(1− 2) = (1− )
(1− δ1)(1− δ2) = (1− δ)
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ACHIEVE: Alarm iff no HB is provided within t-time
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Atrip)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Atrip ∨Hpres)] ∧
P≥1 [Alarm =⇒ P≥1Alarm] ∧
P≥1 (¬AlarmW Atrip) ∧
P≥1 [Atrip =⇒ P≥1−δ2♦≤waAlarm]
Below are the direct subgoals of the high-level goal. The subgoals are simply partitions
of the six individual properties of the parent-goal, and their equivalence is clear.
ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped iff no HB provided in t′ time
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Atrip)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Atrip ∨Hpres)]
ACHIEVE: Alarm iff AlarmTripped and within t− t′ time of the first AlarmTripped
P≥1 [Alarm =⇒ P≥1Alarm] ∧
P≥1 (¬AlarmW Atrip) ∧
P≥1 [Atrip =⇒ P≥1−δ2♦≤waAlarm]
Below are the subgoals of “AlarmTripped iff no HB provided in t′ time”. This refinement
abstracts the role of detecting the presence of a heartbeat from the rest of the goals and
imposes the following constraint on the introduced variables:
• 1− 1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− ′1)
• 1− 2 ≤ 1− ′2
• wh ≤ g
21
• 1− δ1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− δ′1)
ACHIEVE: Heartbeat Detected correctly tracks the presence of Heartbeats within
t′ − t′′ time
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped iff no Heartbeat detected
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−′1♦≤g−wh
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Atrip
)]
∧
P≥1
[
¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa−wh (Atrip ∨Hdet)
]
AVOID: Alarm if not AlarmTripped
P≥1 (¬AlarmW Atrip)
ACHIEVE: Alarm if AlarmTripped
P≥1 [Atrip =⇒ P≥1−δ2♦≤waAlarm]
MAINTAIN: Alarm if AlarmTripped
P≥1 [Alarm =⇒ P≥1Alarm]
AVOID: Heartbeat Detected if Heartbeat not present
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
ACHIEVE: Heartbeat Detected if Heartbeat present
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet]
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Below are the subgoals of “AlarmTripped iff no Heartbeat detected”. This refinement
specifically enabled us to verify the components of the MWT individually by isolating their
roles. The introduced variables are constrained in the following way:
(1− γ1)(1− γ2) = (1− )
(1− γ1)(1− λ1)(1− λ2)(1− λ3)(1− λ4) = (1− ′1)(1− ′2)
(1− η1)(1− η2)(1− η3) = (1− δ′1)
wroff ≤ g − wh
ACHIEVE: Correct timer reset
Reset ∧
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wronReset
]
ACHIEVE: Correct delay
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] ∧
ThL =⇒ ¬ThH
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2∗wh−wthP≥1−η2
(ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped iff Threshold met
P≥1
[
ThL =⇒ P≥1−λ2♦≤wroffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Atrip
]
∧
P≥1 [ThH =⇒ P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Atrip ∨ ¬ThH)] ∧
P≥1−γ2 (¬AtripW ¬ThL)
ACHIEVE: Initialize to Reset
Reset
ACHIEVE: Reset if Heartbeat detected
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wronReset
]
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ACHIEVE: Threshold delay if Reset
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL]
ACHIEVE: Threshold if Heartbeat Detected is absent
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2wh−wthP≥1−η2
(ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
AVOID: AlarmTripped if reset
P≥1
[
ThL =⇒ P≥1−λ2♦≤wroffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Atrip
]
ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped if threshold for some time
P≥1 [ThH =⇒ P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Atrip ∨ ¬ThH)]
AVOID: AlarmTripped until first threshold
P≥1−γ2 (¬AtripW ¬ThL)
2.2.2.4 Goal Model Implication Proofs
Here we present the formal proofs that the satisfaction of any goal is implied by the
satisfaction of its subgoals.
Lemma 2.2.1. The high-level goal is implied by its subgoals where
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Atrip)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Atrip ∨Hpres)] ∧
P≥1 [Alarm =⇒ P≥1Alarm] ∧
P≥1 (¬AlarmW Atrip) ∧
P≥1 [Atrip =⇒ P≥1−δ2♦≤waAlarm]
is the high-level goal specification, and below are the subgoals:
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Subgoal 1:
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Atrip)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Atrip ∨Hpres)]
Subgoal 2:
P≥1 [Alarm =⇒ P≥1Alarm] ∧
P≥1 (¬AlarmW Atrip) ∧
P≥1 [Atrip =⇒ P≥1−δ2♦≤waAlarm]
Proof. Note that the first subgoal contains the first three statements of the parent goal
and the second subgoal contains the last three. These six statements trivially compose the
high-level goal if both are satisfied.
Lemma 2.2.2. The children of “ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped iff no HB provided in t′ time”
imply their parent where the parent specification is:
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧ (2.2)
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Atrip)] ∧ (2.3)
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Atrip ∨Hpres)] (2.4)
and the subchildren are:
Subgoal 1:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet] ∧ (2.5)
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)] (2.6)
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Subgoal 2:
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧ (2.7)
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−′1♦≤g−wh
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Atrip
)]
∧ (2.8)
P≥1
[
¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa−wh (Atrip ∨Hdet)
]
(2.9)
Proof. Assume that equations 2.2-2.4 true. We will now show that these five equations are
sufficient to prove equations 2.2-2.4 each individually.
1. Equation (2.7) trivially implies (2.2).
2. In order to prove the implication in (2.3) holds, we assume that the boolean variable
Hpres is true. By (2.5), with probability (1− β)(1− α), within wh time, Hdet will be
true. When Hdet is true, by (2.8), with probability (1− ′1)(1− ′2), within g−wh time,
¬Atrip becomes true. Thus, worst-case, with probability (1−α)(1− β)(1− ′1)(1− ′2),
within g time, ¬Atrip becomes true.
Therefore, this implies the (2.3) if we enforce the constraints:
• 1− 1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− ′1)
• 1− 2 ≤ 1− ′2
3. Assume ¬Hpres is true. By (2.6), with probability (1 − β)(1 − α), within wh time,
¬Hdet will be true until Hpres is true. Once ¬Hdet is true, by (2.9), with probability
(1− δ′1), within v−wa−w h time, we will either Atrip or Hdet. Here we have two cases:
Case 1: If Atrip happens within the appropriate time from ¬Hdet being true, then
with probability (1−α)(1− β)(1− δ′1), we will Atrip within v−wa time. This satisfies
(2.4).
Case 2: If Atrip does not happen within the appropriate time from Hdet being true,
then similarly, with probability (1− α)(1− β)(1− δ′1), within v − wa time, Hdet will
become true. If Hdet became true, then by (2.6) it must have been because Hpres
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became true. That means that Hpres became true in at most v − wa time and thus
satisfies (2.4).
Therefore, the subchildren imply the parent if we enforce the constraints:
• wh ≤ g
• 1− 1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− ′1)
• 1− 2 ≤ 1− ′2
• 1− δ1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− δ′1)
Lemma 2.2.3. The children of “ACHIEVE: Heartbeat Detected correctly tracks the pres-
ence of Heartbeats within t′ − t′′ time” imply their parent where the parent specification
is:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
and the specification for the subgoals are:
Subgoal 1:
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
Subgoal 2:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet]
Proof. It is clear that the children compose the parent and are equivalent.
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Lemma 2.2.4. The children of “ACHIEVE: AlarmTripped iff no Heartbeat detected”
imply their parent where the parent specification is:
P≥1−≤u¬Atrip ∧ (2.10)
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−′1♦≤g−wh
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Atrip
)]
∧ (2.11)
P≥1
[
¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa−wh (Atrip ∨Hdet)
]
(2.12)
and the specification of the children are:
Subgoal 1:
Reset ∧ (2.13)
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset] (2.14)
Subgoal 2:
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] ∧ (2.15)
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2wh−wth
P≥1−η2 (ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
(2.16)
Subgoal 3:
P≥1
[
ThL =⇒ P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Atrip
] ∧ (2.17)
P≥1 [ThH =⇒ P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Atrip ∨ ¬ThH)] ∧ (2.18)
P≥1−γ2 (¬AtripW ¬ThL) (2.19)
Proof. Assume the truth of equations 2.13-2.19. It suffices to show that equations 2.10-2.12
are true.
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1. By (2.13), Reset is true. By (2.15), with probability 1 − γ1, ThL will be true for u
time. By (2.19), ¬Atrip will not be true until ¬ThL is true with probability 1 − γ2.
implying (2.10) if the following constraint is met:
• 1−  ≤ (1− γ1)(1− γ2)
2. Assume that Hdet is true. By (2.14), with probability 1− λ1, within won time, Reset
will be true. By (2.15), with probability 1− γ1, ThL will be true for u time. By (2.18),
with probability 1− λ2, within woff time, with probability 1− λ3, we will ¬Atrip for
u time. This implies (2.11) if we enforce the following constraints:
• (1− ′1)(1− ′2) ≤ (1− λ1)(1− γ1)(1− λ2)(1− λ3)
• g − wh ≥ won + woff
3. Assume ¬Hdet is true. By (2.16), with at least (1−η1)(1−η2)(1−η3) probability, within
v − wa − 2wh − wth time, a path will enter a position that satisfies ThH W ♦whHdet.
Thus we have two cases:
Case 1: Once ThH becomes true, before wth time passes, ♦whHdet becomes true.
Therefore, in at most v−wa−wh time, we receive an Hdet and thus satisfy (2.12).
Case 2: Once ThH becomes true, it stays true for at least wth time. Then by (2.18),
with probability 1− γ2, within wth time of ThH becoming true, we will Atrip or
¬ThH . Since we know ThH is true for at least wth time, we know we must Atrip
by wth time. Therefore, we have an Atrip in no later than w − wa − wh time and
satisfy (2.12).
The above cases only hold true if we enforce the following constraint:
• 1− δ2 ≤ (1− η1)(1− η2)(1− η3)(1− γ2)
Because each of equations 2.10-2.12 hold true with our assumptions, it is clear our
subgoals imply the parent.
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Lemma 2.2.5. All parent goals of leaves are implied by their children.
Proof. All leave goals are broken down by conjunction and trivially imply their parents.
Theorem 2.2.1. All the leaf goals imply the high level goal of our goal diagram.
Proof. By all of the lemmas proven above, the leaves successfully imply the high level
goal.
2.2.3 Design
We utilized 3 agents to satisfy the goal diagram for the MWT. The absence detector
and threshold filter were both included in the original MWT. We added a new component,
called an amplifier, to handle the alarm signal from the threshold filter.
2.2.3.1 Absence Detector
The absence detector monitors the presence and absence of heartbeat signals, in other
words, they detect when a fault has occurred. The absence detector consists of a number of
ladders and acts as a timer between heartbeats. Each ladder in the absence detector notifies
the threshold filter when they have not found an H molecule for a sufficiently long time. If
an H molecule is detected by a ladder, it resets its timer to zero and begins counting again.
There are no changes to this device from the original MWT design and the CRN is
shown in Figure 2.2. Li molecules interact with U molecules, which have a constant supply,
to move one step forward along the cascade. When an Li molecule interacts with an H
molecule, it consumes it to reset back to L0. Intuitively, if the number of H molecules is low,
the likelihood of an Li interacting with an H is low, meaning it will proceed through the
cascade until a Y is released. If the number of H molecules is high, the probability of an Li
interacting with enough H molecules to reach Y is very low. The absence detector is assigned
responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [Hdet when Heartbeat is not present], Achieve [Hdet
when Heartbeat is present], Achieve [Initialize to Reset], Achieve [Reset if Hdet], Achieve
[Threshold delay if Reset], and Achieve [Threshold if Hdet is absent].
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2.2.3.2 Threshold Filter
The threshold filter monitors the absence detector to determine the correctness of any
fault detection, this prevents false positives. The threshold filter consists of a ladder that
acts as a barrier to alarming. The ladder molecules interact with Y molecules, released by
the absence detector, to move forward through the cascade. The ladder interacts with R
molecules, which have a constant supply, to reset to the bottom rung.
We modified the threshold filter from the original MWT. It consists of the following
reactions.
Ti + Y → Ti+1 + Y
Tk + Y → Tk + Y +D
Ti +R→ T1 +R
Intuitively, if the number of Y molecules is sufficiently higher than the number of R molecules,
there is a high probability of the threshold filter releasing a D molecule. However, if the
number of Y molecules is low, the R molecules hold the cascades in the lower rungs.
The change from the original design is that D molecules are released by the threshold
filter catalytically. This follows from the goals that require the threshold be reset, for example
Avoid [AlarmTripped if reset]. This goal requires the AlarmTripped signal be turned off
when the timers are reset. AlarmTripped specifies that a D molecule has been released. In
the original design, if a reset occurred after a D molecule was released this goal would fail.
In the new design, if a D molecule has been released, it will quickly be consumed by the
amplifier, discussed in the next section, and AlarmTripped will be turned off. However,
in line with the MWT requirements, once the alarm has been tripped, the alarm will go
off. The threshold filter is assigned responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [AlarmTripped if
Reset], Achieve [AlarmTripped if threshold for some time], and Avoid [AlarmTripped until
first threshold].
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2.2.3.3 Amplifier
The amplifier component is responsible for detecting that an alarm has been tripped
and translating it into a visible alarm. The amplifier monitors for any D molecules that
appear in the solution. Once it encounters at least one D molecule, it begins an irreversible
chain reaction that floods the solution with up to a specified amount of alarm molecules Al.
The amplifier contains the following reactions.
D + Ca→ Al + Ca
Al +Da→ 2Al
At initialization, we begin with a number of Ca molecules, these are the catalyst that
search for D molecules to initiate an alarm, and a specified number, p, of Da molecules,
which denotes how many Al molecules the amplifier must create. When a D molecule is
introduced into the solution, it interacts with a Ca molecule to produce an Al molecule.
The Al molecules are used catalytically to produce more Al molecules until their count is at
least equal to p. The amplifier was assigned responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [Alarm if
Not AlarmTripped], Achieve [Alarm if AlarmTripped], and Maintain [Alarm if the Alarm
has been issued].
2.2.4 Tool Assisted Verification
In many of the intended uses of the MWT, an absence of a heartbeat indicates that
the system is in an unsafe state. The safety-critical nature of such systems requires the
MWT to be robust, reliable, and correct. It is necessary to perform verification over the
design and system requirements for the MWT. Due to the complexity of the MWT and
the inherently probabilistic nature of the domain, manual verification is complex, making
software verification tools a desirable alternative.
Given the CRN design of each of the three components, we constructed a model of each
component using the PRISM model checker [37], which has been used to perform verification
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Figure 2.5 MWT ODE Simulation using MATLAB’s SimBiology package.
on molecular systems previously [35, 38]. We utilized the formal CSL specification of each
leaf goal as a property to check against each model. To fill in the internal parameters of the
goal specifications, we used an incremental development process. We began with simulations
of the model to find likely ranges for each parameter. Figure 2.5 shows a ODE simulation
of the MWT design using the MATLAB package SimBiology. Then, using PRISM’s
capability to test a range of parameters, we performed incremental model checking on the
components to narrow down the values for each parameter. The end result was, for each
component, a model that specified all parameters for the goal diagram and that satisfied
each of its assigned leaf goals.
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2.3 Runtime Fault Detection Device
The work presented in this section was performed in collaboration with Titus H. Klinge,
James I. Lathrop, Jack H. Lutz, Robyn R. Lutz, and Andrew S. Miner and appears in
[18]. Our goal was to extend the capabilities of the Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT).
Previously, its uses were limited to the detection of a single fault, which it would respond to
by initiating an alarm. The first problem with the MWT is that it can only be used a single
time. The amplifier component can only be used a single time, since the species involved in
the reactions have limited counts and are consumed in their use. The second major problem
is that it only produces an alarm, which is then present in the solution forever. The MWT
would be a far more useful device if it was able to initiate direct response to a system failure.
Here we present the Runtime Fault Detection (RFD) device, an advancement on the
MWT that maintains a high output signal whenever failure is detected and no output signal
while failures are not detected. The RFD responds in real-time, with a controllable delay, to
failures in the monitored system and provides a recovery signal, called henceforth an alarm,
to either trigger a programmed response or as an externally visible alarm. Recovery actions
can include any action that helps the system recover from its failure. For example, the alarm
could lead to the correction of the fault within the monitored system or activate a backup
system to replace the failed system. We discuss the requirements and specification of the
RFD as a modification of the MWT. We show its correctness using formal methods. We
present an example case of the RFD embedded with a molecular oscillator as a monitored
system.
2.3.1 Requirements Analysis for the RFD
In this section, we discuss the requirements for the RFD. We describe the informal goal
diagram for the RFD. We then describe the environmental assumptions used to satisfy the
goals. Each goal is then given a formal specification in Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL)
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to have an unambiguous definition. We show that each leaf goal’s formal specification leads
to the satisfaction of their parent goals, allowing the entire goal diagram to be satisfied.
2.3.1.1 Goal Diagram for the RFD
There were two primary goals for the RFD, reusability and flexibility in application.
Instead of always producing a single use alarm, and therefore limiting possible uses for the
MWT, the RFD produces an alarm for use by another component. The RFD allows a client
to create a component that reads the presence and absence of the alarm and takes a desired
action. One such component could be a single use alarm, which detects the presence of
the RFD alarm and initiates an irreversible alarm, however the RFD requirements do not
include this third component. The responsibilities of the RFD lie in producing an alarm as
long as no heartbeats have been detected for a sufficient time and producing no alarm while
hearbeats are detected.
The high level goal of the RFD is Achieve[Alarm iff no Heartbeat provided within t time],
seen at the top of the goal diagram in Figure 2.6. The goals are refined into subgoals until
leaf goals are reached. Notice that the goal diagram is a pruned version of the MWT goal
diagram. We removed the subtree containing the single use alarm goals and propogated
the change up the tree. This left the goal diagram for detecting faults and producing an
alarm, but without the single use aspect. The removal of the subtree led to the removal
of the amplifier component from the RFD, which lead to the renaming of the variable
“AlarmTripped” to “Alarm”.
2.3.1.2 Environmental Assumptions
We utilize environmental assumptions to make statements about the domain that are
accepted as true. They are necessary to reason about the correctness of a set of requirements
as applied to a domain. Any given domain may have unique environmental properties that
a developer must be aware of when designing a device. The RFD works in a molecular
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Figure 2.6 Goal Model for the Runtime Fault Detection Device.
domain, which consists of a set of molecules floating in a liquid solution. We make a number
of assumptions about the domain to ensure our design performs correctly. In addition to the
environmental assumptions listed with previous iterations of the MWT, see Section 2.2.2.2,
we include the new assumption that H molecules are intrinsically ephemeral, so they will
naturally decay over time. When a heartbeat is introduced into the solution, it will increase
the number of H molecules by a programmed “dose” and then their count will naturally
fall towards zero. If no new heartbeats are added, the H molecules will disappear from the
solution entirely.
2.3.1.3 Formal Requirements for the RFD
In order to perform formal verification on the design of the RFD, each goal needs a
formal specification. Each goal is assigned a formal specification in Continuous Stochastic
Logic (CSL) as it is available in the model checking tools that we use, PRISM and SMART.
The complete CSL specifications are shown in Table 2.1, which lists each goal, its formal
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specification, and the agent assigned responsibility to it in a breadth first order over the
goal diagram.
During the refinement of the high level goal into subgoals, and subsequent refinements
into leaf goals, a number of parameters internal to the RFD specifications are generated. As
in the MWT, the client specifies two time bounds and two error bounds.
u - The minimum time since the last heartbeat that the RFD may issue an alarm.
v - The maximum time since the last heartbeat by which the RFD must issue an alarm.
 - Probability of error allowed by the u-delay
δ - Probability of error allowed by the v-delay
These parameters are used as a base to generate bounds on the internal parameters of the
RFD. The internal parameters with a brief description are listed below.
• 1 and 2 are refinements from  that determine the allowed error in avoiding Alarms
while heartbeats are present.
• wa is a time bound on turning on the alarm.
• α and β are allowed error in detecting the presence of heartbeats.
• wh is the maximum time to detect the presence or absence of a heartbeat.
• ′1 and ′2 are allowed error in avoiding Alarms while a heartbeat is detected.
• g is the time allowed between detecting a heartbeat and keeping the Alarm off.
• δ′1 is the allowed error in initiating an Alarm when no heartbeat is detected.
• λ1 is the allowed error in Resetting when a heartbeat is detected.
• won is the maximum time to Reset when a heartbeat is detected.
• γ1 is the allowed error in setting the threshold to low when Reset is true.
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• η1, η2, and η3 are allowed errors in setting the threshold to high until a heartbeat is
detected from a time when no heartbeat is detected.
• wth is a time bound on how long it takes to set the threshold to high.
• λ2 and λ3 are allowed errors in avoiding Alarms while the threshold is low.
• woff is the maximum time allowed between a low threshold and keeping the Alarm
off.
• η4 is the allowed error in turning the Alarm on after the threshold is high.
• γ2 is the allowed error that the Alarm is off at least until the first time that the
threshold is not low.
We utilized formal proofs to ensure that the formal specification of any goals children
implied the satisfaction of their parent goals. As the goal diagram is the same as the MWT,
with a subtree removed and only a single variable renamed, the proofs within Section 2.2.2.4
remain true over the new goal diagram, and no new proofs are needed.
2.3.2 Design
In this section we discuss the design of the RFD and how it differs from the MWT. The
primary difference is that the RFD can be reset for reuse after it has produced an alarm.
The amplifier restricted the MWT to only produce a single alarm. By removing the amplifier,
we enable the RFD to trigger different types of responses. The RFD can provide a single
use alarm if desired, but it is also capable of triggering a recovery signal to either correct
the detected fault or activate backup systems. We briefly discuss the absence detector and
threshold filter components and their responsibilities in goal satisfaction.
2.3.2.1 Absence Detector
The absence detector component remains largely unchanged from the previous iteration
of the device, the MWT. It consists of ladders, sequential cascades of reactions that are
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Table 2.1 The formal specification for each goal and its assigned agent.
Goal CSL Specification Agent
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff no Heartbeat provided
within t time
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒
P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Alarm)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Alarm ∨Hpres)]
RFD
ACHIEVE:
Heartbeat Detected correctly
tracks the presence of Heartbeats
within t− t′ time
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
RFD
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff no Heartbeat detected
within t′ time.
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒
P≥1−′1♦≤g
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Alarm
)]
∧
P≥1 [¬Hdet =⇒
P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa (Alarm ∨Hpres)
]
RFD
AVOID:
Heartbeat Detected when
Heartbeat not present
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
AD
ACHIEVE:
Heartbeat Detected when
Heartbeat present
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whP≥1−αHdet] AD
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Goal CSL Specification Agent
ACHIEVE:
Correct Timer Reset
Reset ∧
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset]
RFD
ACHIEVE:
Correct Delay
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] ∧
ThL =⇒ ¬ThH
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2∗wh−wthP≥1−η2
(ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
RFD
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff Threshold met
P≥1 [ThL =⇒
P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Alarm
] ∧
P≥1 [ThH =⇒
P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)] ∧
P≥1−γ2 (¬AlarmW ¬ThL)
RFD
ACHIEVE:
Initialize to Reset
Reset AD
ACHIEVE:
Reset if Hdet
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset] AD
ACHIEVE:
Threshold delay if Reset
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] AD
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Goal CSL Specification Agent
ACHIEVE:
Threshold if Hdet is absent
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2wh−wth
P≥1−η2 (ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
AD
AVOID:
Alarm if Reset
P≥1 [ThL =⇒
P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Alarm
] TF
ACHIEVE:
Alarm if Threshold for some time
P≥1 [ThH =⇒
P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)]
TF
AVOID:
Alarm until first Threshold
P≥1−γ2 (¬AlarmW ¬ThL) TF
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reset upon the introduction of the heartbeat species H. However, in response to our new
environmental assumptions, H is used catalytically, meaning that the reactions do not “use
up” the H molecules when they occur, to reset the ladders. The behavior of the device
remains the same. While no H molecules are present in the solution, the ladders will proceed
forward through their cascades. If no H molecules are introduced before they reach the top
rung, they each release a molecule notifying the threshold filter that they have not detected a
heartbeat in a sufficient period of time. When H molecules are introduced into the solution,
the ladders are reset to their initial state and remain in their lower rungs until the H
molecules disappear. The difference now is that the absence detector bears no responsibility
or control over the heartbeat species; its presence and absence are entirely controlled by the
environment. This has the added advantage of making the ladders completely independent
of one another, meaning any analysis performed on a single ladder can be applied to the
absence detector as a whole.
The absence detector is assigned responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [Hdet when
Heartbeat is not present], Achieve [Hdet when Heartbeat is present], Achieve [Initialize to
Reset], Achieve [Reset if Hdet], Achieve [Threshold Delay if Reset], and Achieve [Threshold
if Hdet is absent] as shown in Figure 2.6. The updated CRN for the absence detector ladders
contains the following reactions
Li + U → Li+1 + U (0 ≤ i < k),
Li +H → L0 +H (0 < i ≤ k).
We rename the top rung of each ladder Y to denote its use as a catalyst in the threshold
filter.
2.3.2.2 Threshold Filter
The threshold filter also remains largely unchanged from the MWT. It consists of a set
of ladders with a catalyst R, which restrains the ladders from proceeding through their
cascades in the absence of Y molecules. The change made to the threshold filter is that we
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no longer release D molecules into the solution while at the top rung of the ladder. Instead,
we rename the top rung of the ladder D, meaning we produce an alarm as long as one or
more of the ladders is sitting in the top rung. In the absence of Y molecules, no ladder
will reach the top rung, meaning no D molecules will be produced into the solution. In the
presence of many Y molecules, the ladders will still climb to the top rung, which produces a
number of D molecules into the solution. Unlike the MWT, if the monitored system recovers
from its failure, the absence detectors will fall out of the top rung, removing the Y molecules
from the solution. The absence of Y molecules will force the threshold filter ladders to fall
out of their top rungs, removing D from the solution.
The threshold filter is assigned responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [Alarm if Reset],
Achieve [Alarm if Threshold for some time], and Avoid [Alarm until first Threshold]. The
threshold filter consists of the reactions
Ti + Y → Ti+1 + Y (0 ≤ i < k),
Ti +R→ T0 +R (0 < i ≤ k),
where the top rung is renamed D.
2.3.3 Verification of the RFD
Formal verification methods provide assurance that a proposed system design satisfies
the intended system behavior, specified by the requirements. We must ensure with high
probability that if a heartbeat is present, the RFD will produce no alarm and while heartbeats
remain absent for sufficiently long, the RFD will quickly produce an alarm. We discuss below
the techniques used to verify the accuracy and robustness of the RFD and the results of the
verification. We show using software tools that formal model checking and simulation aid in
the verification of the RFD. We demonstrate that the RFD satisfies the formal specification
of the goal diagram using two software model checkers PRISM [37] and SMART [10, 11].
We show the functionality of the RFD using a specific example of a system that needs to
be monitored during runtime and by verifying that its heartbeat behavior is correct. Finally,
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we discuss the addition of a recovery module, specific to the example monitored system,
which triggers a recovery response to the RFD’s alarm and show using simulation that the
behavior of the composed system satisfies the intended behavior.
2.3.3.1 Verification of the RFD design
The RFD is an extension of the MWT. It utilized two components of the MWT, with
very minor modifications. First, the heartbeat species is used catalytically, so it is not
consumed by the absence detector. Second, the threshold filter can be reset from a state
containing an alarm, a non-zero number of D molecules, to a state with no alarm, zero D
molecules.
We modified the existing models, the PRISM and SMART models, for the absence
detector and the threshold filter to reflect these few changes. We updated the reactions for
the absence detector ladders in both models and introduced a new reaction to reflect the
environmental assumption that H molecules decay naturally over time. By programming
the rate of decay of the H molecules to be equivalent to the rate of consumption by the
MWT absence detector, the behavior of the absence detector within both devices remains
identical. We updated the reactions for the threshold filter in both models to reflect the
design changes. The only changes made were to rename the top rung of the threshold filter
ladders D and remove D as an additional production from the reaction, which simplified
the model. We re-performed verification, as specified in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.4, on both
models within PRISM and SMART to show that the design still satisfied its responsibilities
from the goal diagram.
Using simulation, via the MATLAB package SimBiology, we verified that the RFD is
reusable. From a state containing an alarm, if the monitored system begins producing
heartbeats again, the RFD is reset. At system initialization, the absence detector begins
with most of its population in the lower rungs of the ladder and it returns to this state when
a heartbeat is detected, resetting the RFD for reuse.
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2.3.3.2 Verification of RFD Interaction with a Monitored System
We assign a set of assumptions on the behavior of a monitored system. We present
a system to be monitored by the RFD and show that it can satisfy the assumptions we
assigned to it. We show using model checking and simulation that the interaction is correct
over two different molecular population sizes.
Model checking has a number of limitations, primarily in memory and computation
cost. A molecular system containing a small number of molecules, but a large number of
reactions may lead to a large size model that consumes either too much memory or too
much computation time to be reasonably verified. As an example, an absence detector with
5 ladders produced a continuous time Markov-chain (CTMC) with over 150,000 states, while
10 absence detectors produced a CTMC with over 9 million states. Due to the restrictions on
model size, verification of the RFD is reasonable on molecular counts of up to 5. Verification
on larger population counts is performed using simulations. Using SimBiology to perform
simulations and PRISM and SMART for model checking, we verified that the RFD correctly
translates the presence or absence of heartbeats into a correct alarm. We first utilized a
hypothetical heartbeat, an abstract signal received from a monitored system for both types
of verification.
We then introduced an example monitored system to show that the heartbeat assumptions
made are realistic. We utilized simulation and model checking to ensure that the monitored
system correctly produces heartbeats while healthy and fails to produce heartbeats while
unhealthy. Model checking the monitored system suffers from the same restrictions that
apply to the RFD, model checking large population sizes is infeasible. Instead, we used
simulations to show that its behavior was correct on population sizes up to 100,000.
We utilized a chemical oscillator, many of which can occur naturally in nature to
demonstrate the capabilities of the RFD when attached to a monitored system. Oscillators
have been widely studied in molecular programming, and have previously been used as
benchmarks, such as [21, 2]. A chemical oscillator can also be easily extended to produce a
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heartbeat, since it continually returns to the same states. In the SCRN domain, an oscillator
can be controlled to test both the normal case, heartbeats output within a specified period,
and the failure case, heartbeats cease to be produced.
We used the Lotka-Volterra 3-Phase Oscillator, discussed in [8], as an example monitored
system. The oscillator uses three molecular species A, B, and C, where each species
corresponds to a phase of oscillation. At initialization, one of the species is given a high
molecular count while the other two species are give a low, but non-zero, molecular count.
The oscillator will cycle between phases in the order A to B to C and return back to A.
As an example, consider the following case. If A is dominating and B and C have similar
molecular counts, then reactions (2.20) and (2.22) below are equally likely to occur. However,
when reaction (2.20) or (2.22) fires, the rates of all the reactions change, increasing the
rate of reaction (2.20) and decreasing the rate of reaction (2.22). This continues until B is
dominating, completing the transition to phase B. A similar sequence of events occurs for
each phase transition.
In order to test the monitored system, we needed to construct a heartbeat interface.
The RFD requires that a heartbeat interface be attached to a monitored system in order to
provide heartbeats. If no heartbeat interface exists, the monitored system cannot produce
heartbeats. We extended the CRN model of the oscillator with a heartbeat interface. The
heartbeat interface produces H molecules as long as the oscillator is healthy. The CRN for
the oscillator with the attached heartbeat interface is:
A+B
k−→ 2B +H (2.20)
B + C
k−→ 2C (2.21)
C +A
k−→ 2A (2.22)
H
k2−→ ∅ (2.23)
If a device has more than one failure mode, an attached heartbeat interface must cover
all possible failures. In the stochastic domain, the 3-phase oscillator has two failure modes.
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First, if any of the phase species A,B, or C has a molecular count of zero, no oscillations
can occur. From such a state, only one of the three reactions can occur, leading to a single
phase species having all of the molecules in the solution. Second, if the oscillator remains at
or near equilibrium, all three species have similar molecular counts, the oscillations will be
negligible and any device using it may fail. By the heartbeat interface, while the oscillator
is healthy, a large number of H molecules will be produced as reaction 2.20 occurs, that
is as the phase transitions from A to B. The production of H molecules must be distinct
between healthy and unhealthy states. If any of the molecular species has a count of zero,
the rate of all the oscillator reactions will quickly approach 0. Since the production of H is
dependent on reaction 2.20, no more heartbeats will be produced. If all three species are
near an equilibrium state, the production of H molecules will fall to a roughly constant
amount, below the necessary threshold to be considered a heartbeat, causing the absence
detector to activate.
In a “real-world” scenario, the monitored system is responsible for producing a correct
heartbeat, meaning the RFD assumes that the heartbeat correctly reflects the health of a
monitored system. Therefore, to verify the correct behavior of the RFD with the oscillator,
we needed to confirm that the heartbeat output by the oscillator reflects its health. We
define states of the monitored system to be healthy or unhealthy. If the oscillator is in
a healthy state, it will send a heartbeat within a reasonable amount of time or the state
will quickly become unhealthy. If the oscillator is in an unhealthy state, no heartbeat
will be sent within a reasonable amount of time or the state will quickly become healthy.
Formally, we define a healthy state as any state with species counts A,B,C > 0 AND
(A−B)2 + (B − C)2 + (C −A)2 > τ , where τ is defined as a distance from equilibrium.
Based on the desired behavior of the heartbeat interface, we created three properties to
verify over the monitored system:
Achieve[Produce heartbeats while healthy]
P≥1[(healthy =⇒ P≥1−δ1 [♦≤t1((hbHigh ∨ ¬healthy)])]
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Avoid [Produce heartbeats while unhealthy]
P≥1[(¬healthy =>
P≥1−δ2 [♦≤t2(P≥1−δ3 [hbLowW (P≥1−δ4 [≤t3healthy])])])]
Heartbeat decays
P≥1[(hbHigh => P1−δ5 [♦<=t4¬hbHigh])]
We performed model checking on the oscillator with the three properties on population
sizes of up to 200, that is the sum of the molecular counts of A, B, and C was equal to
200. PRISM and SMART both verified true that the oscillator plus heartbeat interface
satisfied the above properties. We also performed simulation over a wide range of initial
counts of A, B, and C along with variations in the initial ratio (e.g., 80% in A, 10% in B
and C) and an initial count of 0 for H and checked these properties against the results. The
simulations demonstrated that the heartbeats correctly reflect the health of the oscillator.
Figure 2.7 shows a simulation of the first failure mode, where one of the species counts
reached 0, causing the production of heartbeats to cease.
We used SimBiology to extensively simulate the composed system of the oscillator and
RFD. A stochastic simulation of the composed system can be seen in Figure 2.8. The
oscillator begins in a healthy state and produces heartbeats correctly. When one of the
species counts reaches 0, the oscillations and heartbeat production cease. The absence of
heartbeats is quickly detected and a recovery signal, discussed further in Section 2.3.3.3,
is produced to correct the fault. The oscillator returns to a healthy state and resumes the
production of heartbeats.
The oscillator is provided as an example of a monitored system and of how a client
can provide a heartbeat interface, specified as a rate and size of heartbeat production, and
we can generate an RFD to monitor it. The RFD is designed to work independent of the
heartbeat production method, meaning any system that can produce heartbeat while healthy
and cease heartbeat production while unhealthy can be monitored by the RFD. The client
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Figure 2.7 A simulation of the oscillator with the heartbeat interface.
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Figure 2.8 A simulation of the oscillator with the RFD.
specifies the 4 parameters, described in Section 2.3.1.3. Given a set of parameters, we will
provide a design model of the RFD that satisfies the goal diagram.
2.3.3.3 Recovery Module for a Molecular Oscillator
A system that can recover from failure is far more robust than one that cannot recover
autonomously. The RFD can do more than simply report the failure of the monitored
system, it can trigger a recovery response. We designed a recovery module, to be attached
to the output of the RFD, to reboot the oscillator from a failed state.
The CRN for the recovery module is:
D +A
k−→ D +B (2.24)
D +B
k−→ D + C (2.25)
D + C
k2−→ D +A, (2.26)
where it is important that the reaction rate of the third reaction is different from the other
two. D is used catalytically in all three reactions, meaning they are only triggered in the
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presence of D molecules. If the oscillator fails due to a molecular species disappearing, the
RFD produces an alarm used by the recovery module to jump start the oscillations. If the
oscillator fails at equilibrium, the recovery module will turn on and since the rates of the
three reactions are different, the oscillator will move away from an equilibrium state. In
either case, once the oscillator is running again, the heartbeat production resumes, turning
off the alarm and recovery module.
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CHAPTER 3. CONCENTRATION MONITOR
The work presented in this chapter was performed in collaboration with James I. Lathrop
and Robyn R. Lutz and was previously presented at the 4th ACM International Conference
on Nanoscale Computing and Communication Washington DC, USA, September 27-29, 2017
[19]. It is an extension of previous work by Titus H. Klinge [32].
In deterministic mass-action chemical reaction networks, it can be useful to view the
concentration of a species as a signal. Signals are only allowed to be used as a catalyst in any
reaction that uses them. Given a signal, we often want to react to the strength of a signal.
However, in a CRN, it can be difficult to distinguish minor variations in signal strength.
We define a Concentration Monitor as a device that monitors a signal and provides
an output dependent on the concentration of the input signal. A Concentration Monitor
has two thresholds, α and β, which are “high” and “low” respectively. The Concentration
monitor will provide one output if the input signal has a concentration above α and the
other output if the input is below β.
3.1 Robustness Properties
Many CRNs are designed to complete a specific task. In many cases, they are even
designed to only work for a specific set of parameters. Any changes in the parameters can
disrupt the functionality of the CRN. We seek to define a CRN to monitor the concentration
of a signal robustly correct, i.e., the correct output even with some perturbation on the
parameters and the inputs. Robustness of CRNs has been formally defined in [33]. Here we
give a brief overview of the robustness parameters used.
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We use the following parameters for robustness. A vector δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4) defines four
different types of parameters on the construction of the CRN. δ1 defines the perturbation
allowed on the input signal. This means, if an input signal X has two valid states, α and β,
then X is a valid input when
X > α− δ1 or X < β + δ1,
meaning X is high or low respectively.
δ2 is the accuracy of the output function. That is, when the CRN computes its output,
up to δ2 error is allowed.
δ3 is the perturbation allowed in the initial state. If a CRN is constructed with an initial
value of Y0 in species Y , the CRN is robust in terms of δ3 if it outputs correctly for any
initial condition Yˆ0, where
Y0 − δ3 < Yˆ0 < Y0 + δ3.
δ4 is the perturbation allowed in the rate constants. A CRN is considered robust in
terms of δ4 if for every rate constant k, it outputs correctly for any rate constant kˆ where
k − δ4 < kˆ < k + δ4.
We use  to describe the perturbation allowed in the output. If an output signal X has
two valid states, 0 and 1, then X is a valid output when
X > 1−  or X < ,
meaning X is 0 or 1 respectively.
3.2 Construction of a Concentration Monitor
Given an input signal X, the device monitors for certain concentration thresholds. If the
concentration of X is above the target threshold α, then within τ time the concentrations of
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the output species, Xˆ and Yˆ will have concentrations of the form
Xˆ > 1−  (3.1)
Yˆ <  (3.2)
Similarly, if the concentration of X is below the target threshold β then within τ time the
concentrations of the output species, Xˆ and Yˆ will have concentrations of the form
Xˆ <  (3.3)
Yˆ > 1−  (3.4)
The concentration monitor device extends previous work that defined a signal restoration
device [32]. The signal restorer monitored for inputs of above 1− δ1 and below δ1. Our work
extends this construction for arbitrary inputs α− δ1 and β + δ1.
We formally define the I/O Requirement for the concentration monitor as Φ(τ) = (α, φ).
We begin by defining the context assumption α as
α(u, V, h) ≡
[
V = {Xˆ, Yˆ } and h = h0
]
(3.5)
where h0 is a measurement function defined as h0(x)(Xˆ) = x(Xˆ) for all x ∈ [0,∞)|S∪U | and
Xˆ ∈ V .
As far as the requirement is concerned, the input has two states, which we will define as
a and b. We define a to be any state where the input signal X has a concentration greater
than α and b to be any state where the input signal has a concentration below β. We first
define a predicate on the input value. For a concentration n ∈ R+
φn(I ) ≡ (∀t ∈ I )
[
u(X)(t) = n = p− u(X)(t)],
where p is the constant X+X for all I = [t2, t2] such that t2− t1 ≥ τ . We define a predicate
on the output value. For a bit n ∈ {0, 1}
ψn(I ) ≡ (∀t ∈ I )
[
v(Xˆ)(t) = n = 1− v(Yˆ )(t)]. (3.6)
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We can now define the I/O Requirement φ of Φ(τ) as
φ(u, v) ≡ [ [φa(I ) =⇒ ψ1(t1 + τ, t2)] and (3.7)
[φb(I ) =⇒ ψ0(t1 + τ, t2)]
]
for all I = [t2, t2] such that t2 − t1 ≥ τ . We now specify a construction for a CRN to satisfy
the I/O Requirement.
3.2.1 Construction 1
Given the real numbers τ > 0,  ∈ (0, 12), α > 0, 0 ≤ β < α, and δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4) where
0 < δ1 <
α−β
2+α+β , δ2 ∈ [0, ), δ3 ∈ (0, 12) and δ4 > 0, let b = (α−δ1)(1+β)(1+α)(β+δ1) and n = d2logb( 8−δ2 )e.
Define the I/O CRN [32] N(τ, , δ) = (U,R, S) where
U = {X}, S = {Li|0 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {Xˆ, Yˆ } (3.8)
and where R contains the reactions
X + Li
k1−→ X + Li+1 (∀0 ≤ i < n) (3.9)
Li
k1−→ L0 (∀0 < i ≤ n) (3.10)
Yˆ + Ln
k2−→ Xˆ + Ln (3.11)
Xˆ
k2−→ Yˆ , (3.12)
and where the rate constants k1 and k2 are defined by
k1 = 2δ4 +
2n log(2n)
τ(α− δ1) +
2
τ
log
(
10
(
8
− δ2
)2( 1 + α
α− δ1
)n)
+
δ4(2 + δ1)
δ1
(3.13)
k2 =
2
τ
log
(
3
− δ2
)
+ 4δ4 (3.14)
We define the initial concentrations of the species as
Xˆ = 0 (3.15)
Yˆ = q (3.16)
L0 = p (3.17)
Li = 0 (∀0 < i ≤ n) (3.18)
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where p = 10−δ2
(
1+α
α−δ1
)n
+ δ3 and q = 1 + δ3.
3.2.2 Proof of Correctness
The device consists of two components, a cascade of species L0, . . . , Ln, and an output
component of species Xˆ and Yˆ . The cascade moves in two directions, it climbs forward one
step at a time, and it falls backwards all the way to the first species. The output component
moves the concentration of Xˆ and Yˆ based on the concentration of Ln.
The ODEs for the species L0, . . . , Ln can be defined from their reactions.
dl0
dt
=
n∑
i=1
k1li − (k1x)(l0), (3.19)
dli
dt
= (k1x)li−1 − (k1x+ k1)li, for 0 < i < n, (3.20)
ln
dt
= (k1x)ln−1 − k1ln. (3.21)
The ODEs for Xˆ and Yˆ are
dxˆ
dt
= (k2ln)yˆ − k2xˆ (3.22)
dyˆ
dt
= k2xˆ− (k2ln)yˆ (3.23)
Analysis on these ODEs was performed in [32], and it provides a number of useful lemmas
to prove the correctness of our CRN.
Our goal is to show that the device has correct output for a given input. It suffices to
show the correctness of the device on an input greater than α and an input lower than β
over a time interval I = [t1, t2]
Lemma 3.2.1. Given a CRN defined as in Construction 1, with a time interval I = [t1, t2].
If the concentration of the input signal X is above α− δ1 for all t ∈ I, then by time t1 + τ ,
xˆ(t) > 1− . (3.24)
We first analyze the value of ln(t), the concentration of Ln at time t. Using this, we
will show the value of the output component species. First consider the behavior for an
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input above α. This means that for all t ∈ I , the input X is above α, so x(t) > α− δ1. By
this assumption, the input X has a constant concentration during the interval I . Therefore,
we wrap the concentration of X and the rate constant k1 into the forward rate variable f .
Since the backward rate is always constant we abstract it to the backward rate variable b.
We minimize the forward rate of the cascade by assuming all the concentration of
L0, . . . , Ln is in L0 at time t1, that is l0(t) = p. Since the rate constants k1 can be perturbed
by at most δ4, we minimize the forward rate f and maximize the backwards rate b, giving
f = (k1 − δ4)(α− δ1) and b = (k1 + δ4). By Lemma 6.6 from [32], for all time t ∈ I ,
ln(t) > p
(
f
f + b
)n ∞∑
i=n
ti(f + b)i
i!
e−(f+b)(t−t1), (3.25)
Since ln is monotonically increasing, for all t ∈ [t1 + τ2 , t2], ln(t) ≥ ln( τ2 ) and therefore
ln(t) > p
(
f
f + b
)n ∞∑
i=n
ti(f + b)i
i!
e−(f+b)
τ
2 , (3.26)
Applying Lemma 6.7 from [32], for all t ∈ [t1 + τ2 , t2],
ln(t) > p
(
f
f + b
)n(
1− ne− 1n (f+b) τ2
)
. (3.27)
Since k1 > δ4 +
2n log(2n)
τ(α−δ1) , Corollary 6.8 from [32] tells us
ln(t) > p
(
f
f + b
)n(1
2
)
=
p
2
(
(k1 − δ4)(α− δ1)
(k1 − δ4)(α− δ1) + (k1 + δ4)
)n
(3.28)
=
p
2
(
(α− δ1)
(α− δ1) + u
)n
(3.29)
where u = k1+δ4k1−δ4 . Since k1 >
δ4(2+δ1)
δ1
, we know u < 1 + δ1 and therefore
ln(t) >
p
2
(
(α− δ1)
(1 + α)
)n
(3.30)
Since the initial concentration can be perturbed by at most δ3, p >
10
−δ2
(
1+α
α−δ1
)n
and
therefore
ln(t) >
5
− δ2 (3.31)
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Now consider the output component. The cascade component performed its operations
in the first τ2 time of the interval I . Let f be the rate of converting Yˆ into Xˆ and b be the
rate of converting Xˆ back into Yˆ . By Equation 3.31, we know that by t1 +
τ
2 ,
ln(t) >
5
− δ2 . (3.32)
Therefore, f = (k2 − δ4) 5−δ2 and b = k2 + δ4. Lemmas 6.12 and 6.13 from [32] show that
for f ,b,δ4, and k2 as defined above, xˆ(t) > q −  + δ2. Since the output decision can be
perturbed by at most δ2,
xˆ(t) > q − . (3.33)
Since q can be perturbed by at most δ3,
xˆ(t) > 1− . (3.34)
Lemma 3.2.2. Given a CRN defined as in Construction 1, with a time interval I = [t1, t2].
If the concentration of the input signal X is below β + δ1 for all t ∈ I, then by time t1 + τ ,
xˆ(t) < . (3.35)
Now consider an input below β. This means that for all t ∈ I , the input X is below β,
so x(t) < β + δ1. Since the rate constants k1 can be perturbed by at most δ4, we maximize
the forward rate f and minimize the backwards rate b, giving f = (k1 + δ4)(β + δ1) and
b = (k1 − δ4). By Lemma 6.10 from [32], for all t ∈ I ,
ln(t) < pe
−b(t−t1) + p
(
f
f + b
)n(
1− e−b(t−t1)
)
(3.36)
Since this function is monotonically decreasing, for all t ∈ [t1 + τ2 , t2],
ln(t) < p
(
f
f + b
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.37)
= p
(
(k1 + δ4)(β + δ1)
(k1 + δ4)(β + δ1) + (k1 − δ4)
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.38)
= p
(
(β + δ1)
(β + δ1) + u
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 , (3.39)
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where u = k1−δ4k1+δ4 . Since k1 >
δ4(2−δ1)
δ1
, we know that u > 1 − δ1 and therefore for all
t ∈ [t1 + τ2 , t2],
ln(t) < p
(
(β + δ1)
(1 + β)
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 . (3.40)
Since p < 10−δ2
(
1+α
α−δ1
)n
+ 2δ3,
ln(t) <
10
− δ2
(
1 + α
α− δ1
)n((β + δ1)
(1 + β)
)n
+ 2δ3
(
(β + δ1)
(1 + β)
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.41)
<
10
− δ2
(
1 + α
α− δ1
)n((β + δ1)
(1 + β)
)n
+
(
(β + δ1)
(1 + β)
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.42)
<
10 + − δ2
− δ2
(
(1 + α)(β + δ1)
(α− δ1)(1 + β)
)n
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.43)
<
32
3(− δ2)
(
(α− δ1)(1 + β)
(1 + α)(β + δ1)
)−n
+ pe−b
τ
2 . (3.44)
Since n ≥ log(
(α−δ1)(1+β)
(1+α)(β+δ1)
) ( 64
(−δ2)2
)
,
ln(t) <
32
3(− δ2)
(
(− δ2)2
64
)
+ pe−b
τ
2 (3.45)
=
(− δ2)
6
+ pe−b
τ
2 . (3.46)
As we showed before p < 323(−δ2)
(
1+α
α−δ1
)n
+ 2δ3,
ln(t) <
(− δ2)
6
+
32
3(− δ2)
(
1 + α
α− δ1
)n
e−b
τ
2 + 2δ3e
−b τ
2 . (3.47)
Since b = k1 − δ4 > 2τ log
((
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(−δ2)2
)(
1+α
α−δ1
)n)
,
ln(t) <
(− δ2)
6
+
(− δ2)
60
+ 2δ3e
−b τ
2 (3.48)
<
(− δ2)
6
+
(− δ2)
30
, (3.49)
whence for all t ∈ [t1 + τ2 , t2]
ln(t) <
(− δ2)
5
(3.50)
Now consider the output component. The cascade component performed its operations
in the first τ2 time of the interval I . Let f be the rate of converting Yˆ into Xˆ and b be the
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rate of converting Xˆ back into Yˆ . By Equation 3.50, we know that by t1 +
τ
2 ,
ln(t) <
(− δ2)
5
(3.51)
Therefore, f = (k2 + δ4)
(−δ2)
5 and b = k2 − δ4. Lemmas 6.12 and 6.13 from [32] show that
for f ,b,δ4, and k2 as defined above, yˆ(t) > q − + δ2. Since xˆ(t) + yˆ(t) = q for all t ∈ [0,∞),
xˆ(t) < − δ2 (3.52)
yˆ(t) > q − + δ2 (3.53)
for all t ∈ [t1 + τ, t2]. Since q can be perturbed by at most δ3, and the output can be
perturbed by at most δ2
xˆ(t) <  (3.54)
yˆ(t) > 1−  (3.55)
Thus a CRN defined as in Construction 1 satisfies the I/O Requirement for a concentration
monitor.
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CHAPTER 4. ROBUST CIRCUITS
The work presented in this chapter was performed in collaboration with Titus H. Klinge
and James I. Lathrop.
Logic gates play a key role in computing with uses ranging from simple boolean operations
to microprocessors. The correctness of logic gates is important to ensure no errors arise
during computation. The utility of logic gates is also desirable in safety-critical programmed
molecular systems. For example, logic gates can be used to handle data and to verify
properties on data.
In this chapter we present a construction for a 2-input NAND gate made from a chemical
reaction network. We prove that the design simulates a NAND gate correctly and robustly
with respect to perturbations on rate constants, initial concentrations, output calculation
and input values. We then prove that any combinational logic gate can be simulated using
the 2-input NAND gate. All the CRNs presented in this section use deterministic mass
action kinetics.
4.1 2-Input NAND Gate
We construct an NAND gate that takes 2 inputs, X1 and X2. X1 and X2 are “dual-railed”,
meaning they have compliment species, X1 and X2 respectively, such that X1 +X1 = C
is always true for some initial constant C. The NAND Gate has two output species, Xˆ
and Yˆ , where Yˆ high is considered to be an output of 1 and Xˆ high is considered to be
an output of 0.. We consider all inputs to be binary, that is they are considered to be
1 when their concentration is above some 1 − δˆ1 and they are considered to be 0 if their
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concentration is below δˆ1. If both inputs X1 and X2 are considered to be 1 over a time
interval I = [t1, t2], then by t1 + τ time the concentrations of the output species, Xˆ and Yˆ
will have concentrations of the form
Xˆ > 1−  (4.1)
Yˆ <  (4.2)
Similarly, if the concentration of either X1 or X2 is below δˆ1 then within τ time the
concentrations of the output species, Xˆ and Yˆ will have concentrations of the form
Xˆ <  (4.3)
Yˆ > 1−  (4.4)
More formally, given the propagation delay τ , as a positive real number, we can define
the requirement for a NAND gate as Φ(τ) = (α, φ). We define the context assumption α as
α(u, V, h) ≡
[
V = {Yˆ , Xˆ} and h = h0
]
(4.5)
where h0 is a measurement function defined as h0(x)(Yˆ ) = x(Yˆ ) for all x ∈ [0,∞)|S∪U | and
Yˆ ∈ V .
The two inputs can have the binary values of n,m ∈ {0, 1}, so we define the predicate
on an input as
φn,m(I ) ≡ (∀t ∈ I )
[
u(X1)(t) = n = 1− u(X1)(t)and (4.6)
u(X2)(t) = m = 1− u(X2)(t)
]
for all I of length greater than or equal to τ . We also define a predicate on the output value.
For a bit n ∈ {0, 1}
ψn(I ) ≡ (∀t ∈ I )
[
v(Yˆ )(t) = n = 1− v(Xˆ)(t)]. (4.7)
We can now define the I/O Requirement φ of Φ(τ) as
φ(u, v) ≡ [ [φ11(I ) =⇒ ψ0(t1 + τ, t2)] and (4.8)
[φ00(I ) ∨ φ01(I ) ∨ φ10(I ) =⇒ ψ1(t1 + τ, t2)]
]
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for all I = [t2, t2] such that t2 − t1 ≥ τ .
4.1.1 Construction 2
We construct the NAND gate as above in Construction 1 with a minor modification. We
replace reaction 3.9 with the following reactions
X1 + Li
k1−→ X1 + Li+1 (∀0 ≤ i < n) (4.9)
X2 + Li
k1−→ X2 + Li+1 (∀0 ≤ i < n) (4.10)
The ODEs for this cascade change to
dl0
dt
=
n∑
i=1
k1li − k1(x1 + x2)(l0), (4.11)
dli
dt
= k1(x1 + x2)li−1 − (k1(x1 + x2) + k1)li, for 0 < i < n, (4.12)
ln
dt
= (k1(x1 + x2))ln−1 − k1ln. (4.13)
That is, both input species equally push the cascade forward.
We also add some constraints to the values of α, β, and δ1. We define α as
α = 2, (4.14)
since we want the input to be above α when both input species X1 and X2 are considered
to be 1. We define β as
0 ≤ β < α, (4.15)
however, the closer β approaches α the more accurate the NAND gate is. Ideally, we define
β as at least
β = α− 1 = 1. (4.16)
Each input species is allowed to be perturbed by at most δˆ1. Therefore we add the constraint
2δˆ1 < δ1 (4.17)
which ensures that, no matter how far either input species is perturbed within its bounds,
the perturbation will never exceed δ1.
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4.1.2 Proof of Correctness
Lemma 4.1.1. Given a CRN N defined as in Construction 2, with a time interval I = [t1, t2]
such that t2 − t1 ≥ τ , then N |=δ Φ(τ).
Since X1 and X2 are pushing the same cascade forward, it is useful to define the function
x(t) = x1(t) + x2(t). Observe that if we substitute this input x = x1 + x2 into Construction
2, the ODEs are the same as in Construction 1.
The NAND gate requirement cleanly breaks into two subcomponents. It suffices to
show that each case is satisfied. Since the NAND gate is an extension of the concentration
monitor, by Lemmas 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, it suffices to show instead that
[φ11(I ) =⇒ x(t) > α− δ1] and (4.18)
[φ00(I ) ∨ φ01(I ) ∨ φ10(I ) =⇒ x(t) < β + δ1] (4.19)
Consider the case where all inputs X0, . . . Xk−1 are considered to be 1. By their pertur-
bation bounds, this means that
x1(t) > 1− δˆ1, (4.20)
x2(t) > 1− δˆ1. (4.21)
By the definition of X,
x(t) = x1(t) + x2(t). (4.22)
Since both inputs are considered to be 1,
x(t) > 2(1− δˆ1) (4.23)
= 2− 2δˆ1 (4.24)
= α− 2δˆ1 (4.25)
x(t) > α− δ1. (4.26)
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For all other sets of inputs, the worst case is when only 1 input species Xl has a value
below δˆ1 and the other species has its highest value,
xj(t) < 1 + δˆ1 (4.27)
By the definition of X,
x(t) = x1(t) + x2(t). (4.28)
Assume that input Xl has a value below δˆ1. Since the other input is considered to be 1,
x(t) < (1 + δˆ1) + xl(t) (4.29)
< 1 + δˆ1 + δˆ1 (4.30)
= 1 + 2δˆ1 (4.31)
Since α = 2,
x(t) < α− 1 + 2δˆ1. (4.32)
Since β = α− 1,
x(t) < β + 2δˆ1. (4.33)
Whence by the definition of δˆ1,
x(t) < β + δ1. (4.34)
4.2 Combinational Circuits
The following proof is an application of a proof defined in [17]. We now present a proof
for robustly simulating any combinational circuit. We must first define the I/O requirement
for a robust combinational circuit. Consider a combinational circuit Cn,m with n-inputs and
m-outputs. We do not consider feedback loops, so the circuit is a directed acyclic graph
where each node is a 2-input NAND gate. The circuit has n binary inputs and m binary
outputs, so there is an edge in for each input and an edge out for each output. The circuit
has a depth equivalent to the longest path from an input edge to an output edge within the
circuit.
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We define the input species for a circuit Cn,m as
U = {Xi, Xi|0 ≤ i < n}. (4.35)
We define the requirement Φ(Cn,m, τ) = (φ, α) with α defined as
α(u, V, h) ≡
[
V = {Yˆi, Xˆi | 0 ≤ i < m} and h = h0
]
. (4.36)
The circuit Cn,m has an expected set of outputs for any binary input string w of length
n. For such an input string w ∈ {0, 1}n and an input u ∈ C [U ], we use u(t) = w to indicate
that u(t)(Xi) = w [i] for each 0 ≤ i < n. Since Xi and Xi are dual railed, this also means
that u(t)(Xi) = w [i]. Which allows us to define the predicates
φw(I) ≡ (∀t ∈ I)
[
u(t) = w
]
ψw(I) ≡ (∀t ∈ I)
[
v(t) = w
]
.
Using these predicates, we can define the I/O requirement φ for a combinational circuit
Cn,m as
φ(u, v) ≡ (∀w ∈ {0, 1}n)[φw(I) =⇒ ψCn,m(w)(t1 + τ, t2)] (4.37)
for all I = [t1, t2] of length greater than or equal to τ .
4.2.1 Construction 3
Given an arbitrary combinational circuit Cn,m with G gates and a depth of d. Given
the real numbers τ > 0, and δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4) where δ1 ∈ {0, 13}, δ2 ∈ [0, ), δ3 ∈ (0, 12) and
δ4 > 0, with  ∈
(
0, δ1
)
. We define the CRN N by joining G copies of the two-input NAND
gates with the above constants and τ as τd in the obvious way to simulate Cn,m.
Lemma 4.2.1. Given a combinational circuit Cn,m and a CRN N defined as in Construction
3, N |=δ Φ(Cn,m, τ)
66
4.2.2 Proof of correctness
This lemma follows from the robustness of each two-input NAND gate. Each NAND gate
robustly changes its output within τd time. Since the longest path in the circuit is d, within
τ time, the circuit will have the correct output. The output of each circuit will be within 
of the correct output. Since  is smaller than δ1, the input of each circuit will be within δ1
of 1 or 0 meaning that each circuit will robustly compute the correct output. Therefore the
CRN N will robustly simulate the circuit Cn,m within the proper time period τ .
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CHAPTER 5. LOGGING OF CRNS
The work presented in this chapter was performed in collaboration with James I. Lathrop
and Robyn R. Lutz. This work was previously presented at the 4th ACM International
Conference on Nanoscale Computing and Communication Washington DC, USA, September
27-29, 2017 [19]. All CRNs presented in this section utilize deterministic mass action kinetics.
5.1 Logging the State of a CRN
In software systems, logs have a multitude of uses. They can be read externally, by
either another system or an external user. They can be used to synchronize multiple devices
across a network, i.e., to make sure all devices have the same value for a variable. A log
can be used to ensure data is correct or valid before it is passed to another device. They
can also be used as a checkpoint for future rollbacks in the case of an error. Each of these
behaviors can be desirable in a molecular program. We present a method to create a log of
a molecular program.
5.1.1 Log Device
We first define the device used to record the state of a CRN, called the Log Device.
This device tracks a set of input signals, specified at system design, and a log signal. When
the log signal is low, the device will not track the values of the input signals. However, when
the log signal is high, for each tracked signal, the log device will set the concentration of a
copy signal equal to that of the tracked signal. This allows the log device to only take a log
when desired.
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A single log device can track any number of species, but can only maintain a single log
at a time.
We construct a device to record the state of a CRN using two components, a Log Device
and a Log Interpreter, see Figure 5.1. We specify a Log Device to copy the values of
all the species to be logged, made up of Follower CRNs. Consider a CRN device with s
number of species to be logged. Let Xi be the ith species to be logged in the device, Ci be
the species that will contain the value of Xi after it is logged, and log be a catalyst. For
each such species Xi, we construct a Follower CRN as an I/O CRN with
U = {Xi, log}
S = {Ci},
and where R contains the reactions
log +Xi
k−→ log +Xi + Ci, (5.1)
log + Ci
k−→ log (5.2)
where Xi is only used catalytically, since it is an input signal. Since log is a catalyst,
reactions (5.1) and (5.2) have a propensity dependent on the concentration of log. When log
is entirely absent, i.e., the concentration of log is 0, then neither reaction can occur, meaning
that Ci will remain at a constant value. When log is present in any amount, reactions (5.1)
and (5.2) can occur, meaning that Ci will approach the value of Xi.
Intuitively, reactions (5.1) and (5.2) have similar rates. They both share the catalyst
log and the rate constant k. The only difference is that reaction (5.1) has Xi in its set of
reactants and reaction (5.2) has Ci in its set of reactants. When the concentration of Xi is
larger than the concentration of Ci, reaction (5.1) will happen more often. On the other
hand, if the concentration of Ci is larger than the concentration of Xi, then reaction (5.2)
will happen more often. Therefore, whatever the values of Xi and Ci, the value of Ci will
be more likely to approach the value of Xi than it will be to leave the value of Xi. This
behavior remains the same for any concentration of log above 0, but the speed differs.
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To take a log, we first add log to the system to a target amount, speeding up the follower
reactions and allowing them to copy their target species. We then need to remove as much
log from the system as possible, making the rates of the follower reactions approach 0.
Since we are in a deterministic setting, it is impossible to make the concentration of
log = 0 after it has been introduced to the system. Therefore, we seek to lower the value
of log to some  > 0. The smaller we make , the closer to 0 the concentration of log will
be, and thus the slower reactions (5.1) and (5.2) will be. We accomplish this using the
previously discussed Concentration Monitor.
To control the concentration of log between 1−  and , let logSignal be the input that
requests a log be taken. We construct a Log Interpreter, a Concentration Monitor on the
input logSignal. We choose α and β based on the desired log signal input range. Intuitively,
the user provides a threshold above which the input signal is On (α) and a threshold below
which the input signal is Off (β), with the range between α and β unknown. We choose
a τ > 0 time delay and an  as small as desired. We assign the species log and log to
the output species Xˆ and Yˆ respectively, where log and log are “dual-railed”, i.e., a high
concentration of log indicates a low concentration of log, and vice versa.
When the concentration of logSignal is above α, log will have a concentration of at least
1− . When it is below β, log will have a concentration of at most . A log request inputs
enough logSignal to raise its concentration above α, raising the concentration of log to at
least 1− . When we remove enough of logSignal to lower its concentration below β, we
reduce the concentration of log to at most . Figure 5.2 shows the Logging Device applied
to record the concentration of a signal.
5.2 Logging of Valid States of a CRN
Some applications require that only states meeting certain specifications be logged. For
example, consider a CRN system where all the signals used are read as digital signals, i.e.,
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Figure 5.1 Logging a State.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Monitored Signal
Log Request
log log
Log 1 Value
Log 2 Value
Figure 5.2 Simulation of the Logging Device on a monitored system adapted from [36].
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within some  of 0 or 1. In such a case, saving a system state containing values in between 0
and 1 is undesired.
The state logging algorithm is insufficient to only log valid states, as it will log when it
is told to regardless of the validity of the system state. Logging only valid states adds two
new requirements.
1. Detect whether a signal X satisfies its validity properties, and thus has a valid
concentration.
2. Detect whether a state validity property is satisfied by the current system state.
We extend the state logging algorithm to only allow the logging of valid system states.
5.2.1 State Validity
We first define what it means for a signal to be valid. Each signal is a concentration
of a species, meaning that its validity is determined by properties of its concentration. We
define the validity of a signal in terms of upper and/or lower bounds. We specify validity
bounds for a signal using real numbers a and b with a > 0 and 0 < b < a. When defining a
bound we use a and b to determine the range of correct detection. When defining a lower
bound, we say the signal is valid if its concentration is above a, invalid if its concentration
is below b and unknown if its concentration is in between a and b. For an upper bound, we
say the signal is valid if its concentration is below b, invalid if its concentration is above
a and unknown if its concentration is in between a and b. Figure 5.3 shows a graphical
representation of these bounds. A validity property is a boolean expression of the validity
bounds of a signal using combinational relations. A state validity property is a boolean
expression of the validity properties of the system signals.
5.2.2 Validity Detector
To satisfy the first requirement, we begin by constructing a device that detects whether
a signal satisfies a validity bound. For a given signal Xi and an a and b defining a validity
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Figure 5.3 These figures depict the validity of an input signal over time. (A) shows a lower
bound and (B) shows an upper bound.
property, we construct a Concentration Monitor. We define a Validity Detector as a
Concentration Monitor (see Chapter 3) with the following properties. Let Xˆi and Yˆi represent
the validity of the signal, meaning that if Xˆi has a high concentration, the signal is valid and
if Yˆi has a high concentration, the signal is invalid. Assign the validity bounds a and b to be
α and β respectively. Assign Xi to be the input signal X. Assign τ to be a value reflecting
the acceptable delay between input and output. Assign  to be the accuracy tolerance of the
output. Assign Xˆi and Yˆi to be the outputs Xˆ and Yˆ respectively for computing a lower
bound. Assign Yˆi and Xˆi to be the outputs Xˆ and Yˆ respectively for computing an upper
bound.
By the definition of a Concentration Monitor, the Validity Detector satisfies its require-
ments. Suppose there is a lower bound a on the input signal Xi. If the concentration of the
input species Xi is above a,
Xi > α
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and thus, within τ time
Xˆi > 1− .
If the concentration of Xi is below b,
Xi < β
and thus, within τ time
Yˆi > 1− .
Suppose there is an upper bound b on the input signal Xi. If the concentration of the
input species Xi is below b,
Xi < β
and thus, within τ time
Xˆi > 1− .
If the concentration of Xi is above a,
Xi > α
and thus, within τ time
Yˆi > 1− .
If the concentration of Xi is between a and b, its state is unknown and therefore no specific
output is guaranteed.
5.2.3 Validity Gate
As shown in Section 4.2, we can robustly simulate any combinational circuit. We
construct a validity gate as a combinational circuit to simulate the state validity property of
the monitored system. The boolean variables taken as input are the outputs of the validity
detectors of each signal. Since the output of each validity detector is robust, the output of
the combinational circuit will be robust and correct by Lemma 4.2.1.
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5.2.4 Log Controller
The log controller is an extension of the log interpreter from the simple logging device.
Instead of allowing a log to occur whenever the log signal is high, we also require the output
of the validity gate to be high, i.e., the state is valid. We can construct an AND gate robustly
using two NAND gates. We input the log signal and validity gate output into a NAND
gate. We then feed the output of the NAND gate into both outputs of another NAND gate.
This creates a NOT gate attached to the output of a NAND gate, making an AND gate.
Therefore, the log controller only has a high output when both the log signal and validity
gate output are high.
5.2.5 Valid-only Log device
We now show how to construct a logging device that only logs valid states, shown in
Figure 5.4, using the components described in Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.2.4. Specifically,
this helps prevent data from being transmitted that does not meet data quality requirements.
As before, we utilize Follower CRNs to log each signal.
For each monitored signal and a validity bound, we construct a validity detector. Each
validity detector provides a high output if its input signal satisfies its validity bound and a
low output if it is known to not satisfy its validity bound. If the input signal to a validity
detector falls within its error region, no guarantees are made on the output of the validity
detector.
We construct a validity gate over the outputs of all the validity detectors to determine if
the current state satisfies a state validity property. The validity gate provides an output
of Y > 1−  if the state validity property is satisfied and an output of Y <  if the state
validity property is not satisfied. If any of the monitored signals are in an unknown known
state, there are no guarantees on the output of the Validity Gate.
We then construct a log controller as the AND of logSignal and Y , with the error
tolerances on logSignal and Y to determine the parameters, while still having its outputs as
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Figure 5.4 Logging Device Conditional on Validity.
log and log. We use a log controller to control the presence of the catalyst for the Follower
CRNs.
Figure 5.5 shows two simulations of the logging device conditional on validity. Both plots
use the same set of devices in their construction with the validity property (X1 ≥ 0.9∧X2 ≥
0.9). As shown by the figure on the left, when both X1 and X2 have concentrations of at
least 0.9, the state is considered valid, meaning the validity gate has an high output and the
state is logged when the log is requested. The figure on the right is the same model, with
the only difference being that X1 does not satisfy its validity bound. Therefore, the validity
gate has a low output and no log is performed when the log is requested.
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Figure 5.5 Two simulations of the Logging Device Conditional on Validity.
5.3 Further Applications
We now present some further applications of the logging devices discussed in this chapter.
5.3.1 Logging Multiple Devices
Both devices discussed for logging can be applied to multiple devices in a system. Consider
two systems A and B that contain m and n signals to be logged, respectively. To take a
log of their states, we construct a Follower CRN for each signal in m ∪ n and a single Log
Interpreter. Upon receiving a log request, all desired signals in A and in B will be logged.
Similarly, for a valid only log device, we construct a Follower CRN for each signal in
m ∪ n. In addition, we construct validity detectors based on the validity properties of each
system. We have two choices, either to use a single validity gate and log interpreter to cover
both systems, or to use a validity gate and log interpreter for each system. In the first case,
a device will only be logged if both devices are valid, while in the second case, each device
can be logged independently.
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5.3.2 Logging a History of a CRN
We can construct a history of logs using the components discussed previously. For
each signal being monitored, we construct two Follower CRNs, A and B, that use different
catalysts, i.e. L1 and L2. We construct two Log Interpreters, outputting L1 and L2
respectively, that take in different inputs, logSignal and hist respectively. We assign A to
copy the desired signal and B to copy the output of A. By ensuring that we never send
both logSignal and hist at the same time, we will maintain one history log. We can then
chain such devices to create a finite length log.
A consequence of our operating in the deterministic mass action domain is that all
Follower CRNs are always active, regardless of how slow they are. Therefore, the stored
log signal will degrade over time. However, since we can control the concentrations of
the catalysts L1 and L2, and make them as small as desired, we can control the rate of
deterioration.
5.3.3 Checkpoint and Rollback
With a log of a molecular program, we have one or more saved states that the system
realized at a previous point in time. When an error occurs, it may be desirable to revert to a
previous state that was known to be working. The creation of checkpoints is already handled
by either of the log devices. Attaching a number of history devices allows the storage of
multiple checkpoints.
In order to rollback, the molecular program must be able to load the desired state on
command. All the components required for this behavior have already been described here.
We utilize log devices and log interpreters. As stated previously, the log devices copy the
concentration of one molecular species into the concentration of another. We used them
to copy the monitored signals’ concentrations into the copy signals. In order to load a
checkpoint, we need to create another log device, called a Rollback device, where the
signals that have been logged, each Ci, are the signal to be copied and each monitored signal,
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Xi are the copied signals. When the rollback device is activated, it will copy the saved
values back into the monitored signals, resetting the current state to the saved state. The
rollback device requires its own unique activation signal, so that it will only be activated
when desired. A log controller can be used to manipulate the activation signal to be below 
or above 1−  as desired.
When a history of logs is stored, a unique rollback device and unique log controller must
be created for each log stored. That is, if there are k logs stored, k unique rollback devices
with k associated log controllers are required for full rollback capability. As long as each
rollback device and log controller has a unique log signal, only the desired checkpoint will
be rolled back at a given time.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we presented a number of devices that aid in the development of robust
and correct molecular programs. The devices presented here, along with the processes
and methodologies used to develop them, help to ensure that molecular programs remain
fault free or that they remain safe even in the case of a fault. Safety is critical in many
molecular programs due to their potential in medical applications. Requirements engineering
techniques and formal methods, such as simulation and model checking, are essential in the
development of safe molecular programs.
The Runtime Fault Detection device (RFD) and its predecessor, the Molecular Watchdog
Timer (MWT) can be used to ensure that users and other molecular programs are made
aware of any failures that occur. The RFD provides the possibility for a molecular program
to autonomously recover from a failure by triggering a recovery response.
The concentration monitor can be used to validate bounds on a chemical species’
concentration during runtime. It can be used to ensure that data conforms to specifications
either before storage or before the data is passed as input to another molecular program.
Reducing the possibility of data corruption leads to a reduction in system faults. We
further demonstrated the utility of the concentration monitor by presenting an MWT,
constructed with a concentration monitor, for deterministic mass action kinetic chemical
reaction networks (CRNs) ensuring that there exists an MWT for the two most common
kinetics of CRNs.
We presented a robust CRN NAND gate, using the concentration monitor, that can be
nested to create an arbitrary combinational circuit. We proved that the circuits update their
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outputs to reflect changes to the inputs correctly and robustly. Using these gates, along with
the concentration monitor, we developed two devices to log the state of chemical reaction
networks. A log allows devices to recover from failures by rolling back to a state before the
failure occurred. A log can be viewed by an external user or another molecular system to
monitor for faults and aids in determining the cause of faults.
We hope that the devices and processes discussed here prove useful in the development
of molecular programs.
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